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lNTR.oryUCTION 
World War I was fought to end all wars and bring ever­
lasting peace and stability to the world . However, the final 
defeat of the Central Powers and the subsequent treaties not 
only made the future European scene unstable, it also made a 
future conflict unavoidable. Germany , suffering under the 
brunt of these treaties , was also labeled with the res ponsi­
bility of the war, and this fact had profound effects in its 
future relations with other European nations . The outcome of 
the world wir was the remaking of Euro pe . It destroyed old 
empires such as the Hapsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire 
and brought new states into existence. But, the basic problem 
which suppoaedly led to hostilities in 1914 still had not been 
settled. This was the problem of Germany. Germany's equal 
position in international affairs was refused by the victors, 
and reprecussiona of this refusal were to lead the European 
states into another raging struggle for domination of the conti­
nent. 
The ensuing treaties which resulted from the world war 
contained many harsh provision s ,  and German consent to them was 
given grudgingly and unwillingly after long debate whether it 
1 
2 
veuld not b• better to r•fu•e to ei .1n . l Cnnaent was finally 
given because of the veakn••• of the German army, the exhaustion 
of the German peopl•, and the preasure of the Allied bloc�ade. 
not from any conviction that the tenne we�• ju•t or even to ler-
able. The only ••••t which Germany aoquired wu that the 
treaties could work only with the co•operation of the German 
Government .. 2 
Fundamentally the Treaty of Vcraaillea contal ned basic 
objective• designed to implement a stable and complacent Euro-
�an eontiaeot. The frontien of Europe were to � drawn on 
the baai• of nationality; every nationality was to be gi.ven 
independenc e; minoritiea were to be protected; democracy was 
to be the baata of government; con1criptioa wa• to be aboliahed 
among the enemy power• as the first atep towards it aboliti.oa 
everywhere; and di.scriminatioo in the matter of railway and 
river rates wae to be forbidden. 
Not only di.d the t reaty affect Germany's future polit1-
cal relations in the international community, it also had gre.at 
conaequance in their economic relationa. 
The war ••nt: • la.a of wealth and manpower, 
tbe aeveranoe of international comaercial 
ties, and a diaruption of eatabli1hed .,olitical 
l s. Villi• Halperin. Oe!!!!.!Z 
R
iec! Democraczs A 
Political B11torz; of 1:he l!ioh liOiXli9 to 1§33 liittW York: 
w. w. Moreoa & CompanJ,1nc • •  1§&s5. p. t!r. 
2 Ibid., p. 71. 
3 
social, and economic patterns . The 
Treaty of Versailles demanded the 
surrender of the mercha.nt fleet, 
rclling stock , European territories , 
and colonies. It established a 
supervision of domestic and inter­
national political and economic 
relations , and exacted , under duress, 
the promise to pay, in addition to 
the gold and goods sacrifice at the 
cloae of the war, a part of future 
income as reparationa . 3 
In the immediate situation of 1919 the peace treaty 
seemed crushing and vindictive; but in a longer pers pective , 
the most important thing about the treaty was that it was con-
eluded with a united Germany. The defeated nation had only to 
secure a modification of the treaty, or shake it off altogether, 
and she would emerge as strong, or almost as strong , as she had 
been in 1914. This was the decisive , fateful outcome of the 
armistice and the peace treaty . The ''German problem'1 was left 
unsolved . Indeed it was ultimately more acute . 
From its start the peace treaty lacked moral validity . 
It had to be enforced; it did not , as it were, enforce itself . 
In regard to Germany's attitude, no German accepted the tr'=aty 
as a fair settlement between equals "without victors or van-
quished.11 At the first convenient moment they meant to rid 
·-3�llen Thom�� Bonnell, German Control Over International Economic Relations,. .1930�·-.: 1937 · (. "!lihinois -:Studies In The ·-social ici.enc-es, t� vo!, ·:X�VI ;_r Ur.bana ;····.Un:i:vi,r$.ity·  e:,1�·:::-r1liiio1s·�··Press�� ··:1.93'7), Jr�· : t3<;:-: ·<;Fot'" .a-· jtist:�ficlit;�9n-·<?I.t:h� .. V���'il,4:e'- .: .. 1:����y ;!lee,,. 4f.fr�<;i-·j.. t t{ow�e: ) s App�asement: A Study In Poli ti cal Decline or Harold G. #icolson1s iaries ana Letters (2 vols.). 
4 
their nation of all or at least part of the treaty. Thus, the 
ma1.n objective of German foreign policy after World War I was 
to throw off the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and to 
re-establish Germany as an "equal" in all as pects of international 
r�lations. 
The. internal situation in Germany s.t the end of the war 
was one of chaos . They had 8uffered under wartime shortages 
and the r8vages of war, and they were confronted with th� �1-
mogt insun�.c,tmtable task of paying the Allied reparations, T?ith 
the Allied blockade and extreme shortages at home, the �erm3o 
people be.li.eved reparations to be the sole source of their 
pr.oblE>ms. This attitude was s<"on associated with the pe:at-P.­
treaty i.n general , and served to i.ncrease their incess .sn t :!(:sire 
to remov� themselves from its limi.tations. 
The: war-guilt clause was also a 1I1..atter which touched 
the hearts of all Germans.4 Forced into accepting responsibility 
for the ·wa.r, they felt that they had been chained with an unjust 
curse of world damnation. This clause, along with other aspects 
of the peace treaty was to become the rallying post for all 
nationalistic tendencies in Gennany. This nationalism was a 
rampant romanticism, with its emphasis on blood and race, its 
4Nalperin, p. 141. 
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glorification of the past, and its call for individual heroism 
and sacrifice. In the late 1930'• German intellectuals were 
to interpret World War I not ae Germany's responsibility, but 
the responsibility of forces beyond which the German nation had 
any control • 
• • •  in German official opinion the issues 
of the war of 1914 were fundamental, cutting 
across pre-existing philosophies and out­
looks and dividing the peoples of the modern 
world into antagonistic cultural groups dedi­
cated to different concepts of supreme life­
valuea. Germany, as the chief protagonist 
of the old dynastic warrior people of Central 
Europe, had never accepted the premiaea of 
oapitalietic democracy and its implications 
of anarchic individualiam. Although imple­
mented with all the might of theoretical 
science and industrial technology, she bad 
dedicated her immense power to the defense 
of pure Germanism against the challenge of 
. the modern spirit, with its illegal lawless­
ness, its enervating egoism, and its moral 
degradation. Germany accepted the technology 
of Capitalism, never its spiritual dynamics. 
Hence the anachronism of German militarism 
in 1914 • • • .  the subordination of the industrial 
to the instincts of an ancient warrior folk 
which had been romanticized and exalted by 
generations of poets and thinkers. The loss 
of the war meant to Germany the collapse of 
supreme moral values, the dissolution of her 
organic being.5 
The "German problem" loomed large on the European scene 
after the world war, and had it been aettled, World War II might 
5Leon W. Fuller, "The War of 1914 as Interpreted by 
German Intellectuals", !!!!. Journal � Modern History, XIV 
(June, 1942), p .  161. 
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not have been. Rowever, le did r ... in unaettled thereby 
creating an ominoue atmo1phan over Europe. Od'many •tcov• 
to settle the pl'Obl .. ber••U and to reolaia ha poaitioa on 
an international level. Ber foreign policy wae directed to 
thla end and it• effect vu to nwrber•t• throughout Euro,. 
and the world. Oenaanr'• poet-war atruggle vaa to be lons. at\d 
awduoua. On lloYember 14, 1918, in a letter to a fried, Walther 
Belgium 
The ... nt• appear to me in tbe form of th• 
fellowt.n& piotuns It i• oec"•U'J to 011.a, 
a 1t••P cliff. Ve bad hcended up to aa 
appncia�te hetaht; tbn appeared the deep 
cleft vbich • tood ln the way of fureber 
ucnt. Bow we ._..t cleaceocl t• the vall•J 
ta order to bagitl anew with difflcultJ the 
aa••t up the road �b tbU ti•, how..,..-. 
will lead to the top. 
At tlM end of the vu Belgium va1 faced with one of 
the aaat cmaeial deeiaiou in it• 1bon biatory ., an independ-
ent nation. Tb• German lav .. ion and occupation had not only 
left bu dffaatated and in ruin•• but it had •l•o revealed the 
veakneaa of Belgium'• traditional foreign policy ot neutralitJ. 
The O.rman vlolatioo of �latum'• territory durina the war waa 
a breech of international l• wbieb even the Genaan Cbaocellor, 
'waiter btbea•t ·n·:· (1. VOh. I 2nd ed.; J>r••d•fti 
1927) ii, 75. cited ia ltoppe . Pineon, Modern C.nanz: !!!. 
Jll!t!I.! aacl Civt!i•atioa (2od ed.; Mew YoP: Th• MacMillan 
�..,.am_.;an;:. -mis . , . l!2. 
7 
Theobald von l•tbmann•Rollveg. admitted. 
The wroftg - I a,..k fraDkly • the wrong 
we thereby commit, we t-1111 try to make 
good •• eoon •9 our military alma have 
been attained. 
During the var many Germane felt that annexation of 
Btlgbm was neceaaary in order to insure that Belgium. would 
never again be uaed •• • b••• of operation• againat Geaaany. 
It vae • uu••ted that all Belgian fore••· all trauportation 
facilitiea, an4 all means of coaaunlcatioa remain under German 
control. In addition, Belgium vaa to be required to give up 
her army - the reaulting aavinge of money to be uaed for t.be 
mainteunca of Germany'• oecupatioaal fore:••, Belgium'• •ov•r• 
eigoty would have to be liaited in that Belgium could not be 
allowed to follow an independent foreign pol!e1, aad all internal 
matten ver• to be 1ubjeot to a.nan acrutlay.8 
In theconomfc aphere .. lgium waa required to b.eome 
a non-voting member of the a.rmao cuatoma union. her railway• 
and waterway• were cloaely integratad with thoae of Germany. 
Qermany'a monltary ayat• waa extended to Belgium, and the 
�elgiana were aubmitted to Qer..an taxation and eocial legiela�ion.9 
The deatruction of induatri•• in lelgiue through confi•c•tion 
711ana W. Gatzk•, GeftlAnY'! Drive To The Weat (Baltimore: 
John Bopkiaa Pr•••, 1950). p. 8. 
8 
9 
Ibid., p. 13. 
Ibid., p. 14. 
of vital materials, th• liquidation of industrial enterprises, 
and th•ir transfer i.oto a�rman hand• "ti1as necessary, General Erich 
von Ludenforff pointed out , in order_ to create a faits accomplis for 
the postwar peri·od •10 The enforcement· of these ·measures w�s designed 
to break the apirit of the Belgian people; however, the German 
policy only ••rved to unite reaistance and t.o make the tiny 
state a martyr in the •Y•• of the world. 
The violation of Belgium's neutrality was juetif1ed 
by a.rm.any' 1 int iatance that le 1.gi.um had forfeited her pre-war 
neutrality when she entered into military diacue1ions with Great 
lritaio. Jut vutever juttiftcati.on wu given for the German 
action, behind i.t lay the neeee•ity of a quick and d eci ain 
German blOM at Prance. In other words, it wa• essential, from 
the Oel'M1'l point of view, to knock France out of the war •• 
quickly aa po.atble. B•lgium stood beiw.en tM two warring 
nation•. aad neutral or not, ber location forced her 1neteapab1y 
into the conflict. 
With th• concluaion of hoetilitlea in 1918 Belgium was 
a •cathed but determined nation. She had •uffered through years 
of war and occupation which bad weakened her material exiatence� 
however, her spiritual being waa strengthened through the long 
10 Ibid., p. 266. 
9 
period of hardship. At the end of the war, the Belgian people 
emerged with a determination to rebuild and re-establish Bel-
gium to her post-war prosperity. On June 29, 1919, shortly 
after the signing of the peace treaties, King Albert sent a 
letter to his Prime Minister, M. Delacroix, 1tating: 
Luxembourg 
The hour has come for an innnense and combined 
effort from all. 
Everyone must develop a consciouaness of his 
duties of discipline and solidarity towards 
the community • • • •  
Let us assert before all, our will to build 
up a finer Belgium . . • .  
Let us call the whole people to work and to 
the fulfillment of civic duty. The government 
appreciates its responsibilities, Parliament 
is ready to co-operate in the task • . •  
... I am whole-heartedly with all Belgian 
citizens at the moment when they are preparing 
themselves for the great work of peace and 
restoration.11 
On August 2, 1914, the neutrality of the little Duchy 
of Luxembourg was violated by German troops in their operations 
against France. ·\s with Belgium, it was both a physical and 
spiritual blow to the unsuspecting Luxembugers. The Grand-
Duchy was of strategical importance to Germany in that its 
railways opened a way to outflank the defenses of the �euse 
valley at Verdun besides serving as a pivotal point betwPen the 
11Emile Cammaerts, Albert �Belgium: Defender of 
Right (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1935), p. 317. 
10 
armies at Lorraine and those advancing through Belgium. 
The Grand-Duchy could offer little resistance to inva-
sion in that it had been prohibited from having a military 
force by the Treaty of London (1867). Besides the military 
restrictions put on Luxembourg, the Treaty of 1867 also 
guaranteed the Grand-Duchy's independence and neutrality. The 
following year on October 17, 1868, the Luxembourg Constitution, 
in which the Duchy proclaimed its independence, indivisibility 
and permanent neutrality, was established. 
The second Article of the new constitution laid the 
foundation for Luxembourg's future foreign policy. 
The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, within the 
limits determined by the act annexed to the 
treaties of April 19, 1839, under the guarantee 
of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, 
Prussia, shall henceforth form a perpetually 
neutral state. It shall be bound to observe 
the same neutrality toward1 all other States. 
The high contracting powers engage to respect 
the principles of neutrality stipulated by the 
present article. That principle is and remains 
placed under the sanction of the collective 
guarantee of the powers signing parties to the 
present treaty, with the exception of Belgium, 
which is itself a neutral State. 12 
Luxembourg had been created as a Grand-Duchy and placed 
under the administration of the Netherlands by the Congress of 
12Luxembourg !!!.2_ !!!!_ German Invasion Before !!!.2. After: 
The �uxembourg Grey Book (London: Hutchinson & Company LTD., 
1942)' p. 27. 
11 
Vienna in 1815. However it was simultaneously placed within 
the Gennan Confederation . As a result of its part in the re-
volte of 1830, the Grand-Duchy was partitioned , its western, 
French-speaking section becoming a province of an independent 
Belgium. This solution was confirmed by the Treaty of London 
on April 19, 1839, with King William of the Netherlands retaining 
the grand ducal title . Lacking economic ties with the Netherlands , 
Luxembourg entered the German Zolloverein in 1842. Even though 
Luxembourg's independence was guaranteed by the Treaty of 186 7 ,  
the grand ducal crown remained with the House of Nassau (Nether-
lands). The personal union with the Netherlands was severed, 
however, in 1890, when William Ill died and Wilhelmina accended 
the Dutch throne. In accordance with the Nassau Succession 
Agreement (1783), the Grand-Duchy then passed to another branch 
of the Nassa.u line , Grand Duke Adolphus becoming sovereign. 13 
Upon his death in 1905, his son William reigned until 1912 and 
was succeeded by his daughter , Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide , 
who repeatedly expressed pro-German sympathies during the world 
war. However, the Grand Ducal Government maintained a strict 
neutral attitude during the German occupation until the Armistice 
of 1918 . 
--·�'.»WWW,,_ _ __ � 
13Great Britaf.n Naval Intelligence Division , �xembourg 
(' 'Geographical Handbook Series11, Vol. X.V; Cambridge: University 
Press , 1944), p. 74.  
At the end of the t'lar, Luxembourg emerged wi.th a 
fairl}' SO\.tr.d ec:;nomlc .and political foundation as compared to 
E(>lg1um. Thi.a was due primarily to three reasons: (1) pro­
hibited from h«ving any military force by the treety of 1867, 
Luxembourg wa1 in no position to offer any real military reaie­
tance to the German invasion, thua sparing her from tbe ravages 
of war; (2) by maintaining strict neutrality during the oc�u­
pation, and (3) the pro-German sympatbiee of the Grand Duchess. 
Undoubtedly there was some destruction within the Grand-Duchy 
but not on the scale as in Belgium. 
Both Belgium and Luxembourg had pur•ued a policy of 
neutrality prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 19lg; yet 
both states eY.perienced violation of this guaranteed 1tatu�. 
What result was the world war to have on the future foreign 
policiea of �elgium and Luxembourg? Could neutrality still be 
valid aa an international principle? Or would some other arrange­
ment have to be made in order to insure the 1ecur1.ty end inde• 
pendence of the two small European states? These queetion• were 
the main concern of both Belgium and Luxembourg at Veraaillea, 
and their answers were to be the dominating factors in Belgian 
and Luxembourg foreign policy between the two world wars . 
The Netherlands 
Unlike both Belgium and L uxembourg, the neutral state 
of the Netherlands was not subjugated to the sufferinl• of 
13 
inva•ion du ring the ·"orld war. .riOW'ever, Jue to her geo�ra­
phical position, ;Jutch policy was a aubject of great tnterest 
among her neighbors .  \·Jhen war broke out iu 1914 the �etheY­
landa was in J difficult situation� �he �as surroundeJ by 
�h1lligerent states witn wtlr operations taking place juat beyond 
her borders. Thus, mAintainin� her neutrali.ty was a perilous, 
yet eventually successful endeavor. 
The auccea1 of the �utch policy can be attributed to 
four considerations: (1) the impartiality with which she con­
ducted herself towards the belligerent atates; (/) a strong 
determination, 'backed by full mobilization of her army and 
navy during the war, to �esist any serious violation of her 
neutrality; (3) the fact that {;erman military strategi�ts nad 
deemed it unnecesaary for the German thrust to paaa through 
Holland. and ( ,) Dutch neutrality which was es.seritial due to 
her channels through which Germany received urgently nectded 
importa. 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands was a creation of tbe 
Congress of \7i.enna; i.t consisted of Belgium, or eouthern 
Netherlands, and was to serve as a buffer state on the �onti­
nent. Great P.ritain had much influence in this cre&tior; since 
it was easential to British security that no hoatile or poten­
tially hoatile Europ�an power control the coast opposite the 
14 
Thames estua't·y. �n the other hand, the Netherlands was 
favorable to this arrangement in that Dutch interests were 
chiefly overseas and existed largely dependent upon Britis:h 
good will for their protection. 
After the Belgium uprising of 1830 and the resulting 
separation of Belgium from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
Holland found herself playing a smaller role in European 
affairs. Her role as a strong buffer state was gone and in 
its place was devised the "perpetual neutralization" of Belgium, 
guaranteed by the five Great Powers. Reduced to a small-class 
power and forced to take a back seat in European affairs, 
Holland did not play any further major role in the course of 
eventa leading up to the world war. 
Although not directly involved in the world war, Holland 
was indirectly effected by the confrontation. Basically a 
state which prospered through the free international exchange 
of goods, the Allied blockade produced a slow strangulation of 
trade which created the threat of a paralysis affecting every 
branch of economic life. Full mobilization of the armed forces 
helped absorb many of the unemployed, but the financial sit­
uation caused by this mobilization was itself a 1erious problem. 
For Holland the basic solution to her problems was the 
end of hostilities. Wi.th her internal ec-onomic structure 
Fig. 1 
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largely intact, she had only tc revive its operation after 
the Armiatice. Followed by the lifting of the Allied block-
ade, she could alao, for the moet part, re•ume normal operations 
of her coma.rclal activities. In comparlaon to Belgium and 
Luxembourg, the Ret'herl.ands had fared very well. Her neut-
rality had been respected by the opposing groups of power• 
and aha had been apared thrJ terrible experi•1u:e of war on her 
own territory. Reutrality bad aerved the Netherlands well; 
therefore t�r. ... no need for the emall nation to coneider 
any revi•ion of it• foreign poliey. 
The future •eemed hopeful and bright for the Nether-
lands, but it was to •oon face an immediat• and unexpected 
probl• with a cloee neighbor -- Belgium. Th• enauing d1ff1-
culty waa to grow out of Belgium'• reviaion of her traditional 
foreign policy and reeulted in the weakening of what should 
have been a cloae •••ociati.oo between the two small European 
•tate1. Immediately after th• Armistice Belgo-Dutch relations 
were very favorahle. At a dinner on January 16, 1919, ·� ing 
Albert of Belgium apoke to the membere of a Netherlands commission 
in Bruaaela. 
Inheritor• of the glory of the ancient low 
Countriea, equally rich in arti•tic treaauree11 
Rolland a.nd lelsiua •n united by intellectual 
17 
and economic ties which date from 
the early times of their history and 
will operate to bind them closer in 
the future. The public and private 
life of the two peoples is founded on 
a love of liberty, zealous labor and 
commercial honesty. The geographic 
aituation• of the two States make 
them, 10 to speak, a unit, and it is 
difficult to see how one of them could 
keep its freedom if the other became 
enslaved. My compatriot• fully under­
stand this aoanunity of interests, 
created by nature, and their ardent 
desire 11 to see the Kingdom:· of the 
Netherlands devtlop daily in power 
and proa peri ty. 
14Amry Vandenbo1ch , Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815: 
! �§)dy !!!. Small Power Politic• (The Hague: Marti.nus Nijhoff, 
19 t p. 247. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE QUEST FOR SECURITY 
Kaiser Wilhelm II's abdication of the Crown of Prussia 
and the associated rights to the German Imperial Crown on 
November 28, 1918, represented the final step in the dissolu­
tion of Bismark's German Empire.l Prior to his abdication , 
the Empire in all actuality had already ceased to exist. With 
chaos running rampant throughout all the German states, the 
radical wing of the Social Democrats , led by Dr. Karl Liebknecht, 
attempted to establish a Soviet Republic. However , the more 
moderate wing of the Social Democrats, led by Friedrich Ebert· and 
Philip Scheidemann, proclaimed the German (or Weimar) Republic on 
November 9, 1918. It was hoped that the formation of a government 
on a democratic basis would ensure Germany of a better bargaining 
position during the peace talks, but this hope was soon shattered. 
The Allied terms were severe, to say the least. The 
newly formed German Government protested vehemently but to no 
1sidney B. Fay, Germany, Vol. XVIII of !h!_ History of 
Nations , ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (New York: P. F. Collier & Son 
Company, 1928), p. 490. 
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avail. Finally, on June 23, 1919, the GeTman Republic, re• 
aliaing it• de1parate a1t.uatton accepted tlu! Allied terma, 
even "tho.e proviaiona in the treaty which, without having 
any material aignificance, are designed to depri.ve the Geraan 
people of their honor.112 'ftle following week, on June 28, the 
peace treaty vaa officially sigoed at Veraaillea. 
The youDg Weimar Republie waa dealt a ataggerlng blow 
at Vereaill••· Where•• th• victors could have utilised their 
powera to atreogbten the roota of democracy in G�rmany, they 
inatead made the Republic'• poeition infinitely more diffic�lt. 
They failed to Yieualiae the fact that the future peace and 
1ecurity of Europe vaa dependent on the co09olidation of demo-
cracy in Germaay. As it tumed out, th• Weimar Government waa 
abackled vlth th• atigma of aigning a dia1raceful treaty. Th• 
national1ata and reaetionari•• were therefore given a rallying 
point with which to attack the very forces thatstrqye- to ful· 
fill the Allied terma. Tb• future was indeed bleak. 
Then began tba long aerie• of humiliation• 
from abroad, th• shameful epiaodea of the 
reparation• demand• 1 the unbridled domi.nation 
of foreign armi•• of occupation on the l.hln• 
and in the areaa aubject to referendum, the 
overbearing attack• of the military aonmiaaione 
on the 1overeign right• of the Reich. the whole 
2Ralperin, p. 152. 
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carefully worked out ayetem of degrada­
tion to which a disarmed nation, thouJh unbeaten in the field, was subjected. 
In the immediate situation, Germany had no choice but 
to follow a policy of fulfillment in regard to the Treaty of 
Ver1aillea. It was a foreign policy reluctantly carried out. 
while at the tame time every effort vae made to hinder 1 ta 
enforcement. Baaically, Germ.any vae a reviaioniat state 
atruggling againat the ve1tern European power• who had only 
one idea••to perpetuate the power of Ver1aillea. To the old 
enemi•• in the Weat (Britain, Belgium, and France), new ones 
were arti.ficially created and added in the East and the South--
above all Poland and c�echoalovakta. Therefore, the beginning 
of the poet-var period witnea1ed Germany in the center of Europe 
aurrounded by neighbor• whoae foreign policie• were ••••ntially 
tied to the Treaty of Vereaillea and who were determf.ned that 
a strong Germany would never again threaten European stability . 
On the other band, Germany'• foreign policy developed as an anti-
th••i• to the existing conditions and could not have been other-
wiae. 
Luxembourg 
Th• liberation of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg wa• 
ls. Erclcner, Hitl•�'• Conspiracy Againet Peace. trans. 
Emile Bumi (London: Victor Gollaaes Ltd., 1957), p. 197-198. 
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immediately followed by the forced abdication of Adelaide in 
January of 1919 because of her Germanophile policies during 
the war; she was succeeded by her sister Charlotte. As 
Luxembourg had taken no actual part in the war, it had no 
part in the negotiations and deliberations leading to the peace 
treaties. Once normal conditions were restored in the Grand-
Duchy, the grand ducal government sought to decide upon its 
political and economic future. On May 1, 1919, after a mass 
meeting of the people, an appeal was sent to the Paris Peace 
Conference insisting that the Grand-Duchy: 
. • •  upon the integral application of the principles 
proclaimed by the Entente, demand their place in 
the League of Nations and maintain their right to 
dispose freely of their political and economic 
future through a referendum to the whole people.4 
At Versailles the Allied Powers forced Germany to re-
nounce all the benefits deriving from its former agreements with 
the Grand-Duchy in respect of the customs union. Article XL 
went on to state: 
Germany accepts the Abrogation of the state 
of neutrality of the Grand-Duchy and adheres 
beforehand to all the international arrangements 
concluded by the Allies and Associated Powers 
concerning the Grand Duchy.S 
Both France and Belgium had ambitions in regard to Lux-
embourg's future. France concerned herself with a possible 
4!!!!. �York Times, May 1, 1919, p. 9. 
1Luxembourg Anti The :jerman Invasion . . .  , p. 'l (}. 
23 
economic uni.on whereaa Belgium conaidered a political arrange­
ment. The Peace Conference hoped that the conflict of interests 
between B�lgium and France would be reaolved, and the referen­
dum waa delayed with that poaaibility in mind. In September 
of 1919 when the plebiacite finally did take place, an over-
whelming majority of the people elected to remain under the 
reigning dynasty and to enter an economic union with France.6 
As a result of the vote, B•lgium broke off its economi c re­
lations with Luxembourg on October 3, and recalled 1.ta minister. 
Belgian opinion waa expresaed in the National !elge which 
•tated: "l"rance • • •  counts on making Luxembourg an advanced 
nation again, a step which it is unlikely Germany would ever 
take . " 1 
France's foreign policy waa ba1ed on the idea of en­
circling Germany with a ring of non-reviaioni1 t states. Through 
a 1yate1n of alliance• and financial support, France hoped to 
maintain the atatu1 quo in Europe by enauring that Germany would 
never again ri.se •• a ma.1or continental power. France was en-
gaged in negotiation• with 8elg1Wl' to conclude a po1sible 
military agreement, and in order to assure a auccessful arrange-
ment France decided to forego the economic union with Luxew.bourg. 
6Great Britain Naval lntelli.gence Divi1ion. p. 251. 
1m,, October 4, 1.919, p. 1. 
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Luxembourg then had no other courae but to conclude an 
ec onomic agreen�nt wich Belgium. On Decemb•r 16, 1920. a 
fifty year pact waa reached which provided for a slngle Betgo­
Luxeuibourg cu1toms unit and for the ua• of Belgian curr•ncy in 
the Grand-Duchy. l'he same month, Luxembourg wa• unanimously 
voted into the League of Nations. 
1:1 thin the framewor�< of th• Covenant of the League of 
N�tions, ;..uxenibour& pursued s ::>ol:lcy of neutralitv. •.s a 
small s tate with vtrtually no armed forces at its disposal, 
the (;rand 1)uchy lool·ed to the teague as the baaia of its forei�n 
policy. There existed at thi• time some doubt as to Luxembourg's 
international statue of neutrnlity. The Grand-Duchy continued 
to aaaume that the Treaty of 1867 waa still in force, except 
a1 regards Ger.r�ay. ?ranee waa pre pared to liv� guar�ntees if 
Englan;J would do like-wise; howeveT, !»ritain felt th11t f..uxerr­
bourg ' s r.eutrality had terminatej with her entry into the League 
of N ations . As a result, Luxembourg's territorial inte�rity no 
longer had the unqualifi.ed aupport of the PCY ... ,ers; ther•fore, 
the Grand-Duchy followed a rigid policy of neutrality Jn the 
hope of justi.fying her claim to an {nternational guarantee. 
The n:ro decades foll.0t-1ing th .. sf�ni.n� of th• peac• tr�aty 
'"itne11ed t..uxembourg playing no role of maj or significance in 
the realm of international affairs. She was too small to think 
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ir, tel'lll� of %''2-Viiling her tra<li.tiooal policy of neutrality; so 
she continually �xprea1ed her adherence to its principle. The 
g.:-ar.d c.lucal government workt:d within the 1.£-agu« to ach ieve ..1.n­
terna tional (>eace and stability and wu uaually associated with 
the other small st.atea in efforts to bring about peaceful re­
conciliat ion of international diaputea. 
Belgium 
The foreign policy of Belgium underwent a complete re­
vision aa a reeult of the world war and the subeequent treaties. 
The failure of her traditional policy of neutrality meant for 
Belgium that some other means would have to be found to insure 
her f.ndependence an:f integrity. The natural 1olution, from the 
Belgian point of view, wu to aeek 1afety in terri.torial gains 
and foreign alliances. 
During the war there had been a press campai.gn for the 
"rectification" of her Dutch frontier•. The object of this 
campaign waa the annexation of Dutch Limburg (or at least part 
of it), and that part of Dutch territory which laid to the south 
of the Scheldt River, known •• Zeeland Flandera. A distance of 
only fifty miles eeparated the southern tip of the 1utch Limburg 
frontier and the northern frontier of Luxembourg. After the 
war, Belgian annexationiata argued that wi thout aovereignty 
over lower Dutch Limburg, Bel3ium could not build an effective 
? 6  
def :.. ... u s e  s y s t:E:•1r- .:lgni.nst pos s ).cle at -rack frorn. Ger;.:any . 
T0 obte.!in 'rec t i fication" of boundari£:s from defeated 
Ce:rm.9.ny did not seem to be an insurmoun tab".1.e task. 1:.ut to 
reques t  the cess ion of territory from a friendly neighboring 
s tate which had remained neutral dur ing the war pres ented a 
d e  li.cc.:te dip lomatic s i tuation . On February 11,  1919 , the Bel-
gian Forei.gn �Unis ter , Paul Hymans , presented his government ' s 
case to the ?aris Peace Confere nc e .  
Belgium ' s  argument was that the Treaties o f  1839 were 
not a r esult of free negot iations between Belgium and the 
Netherlando but were ins te ad impos ed upon the two s tates by 
the Great �·owers . And, as only France and Great Britain had 
fulfilled their ob ligat ions , Belgium had the right to demand 
revis ion of: tl .. e Belgo-Dutch Treaty of 18 3 9 .  8 Forei5n }; i n:ts ter 
Hymans went on to sugges t  that the Ne ther lands be corr.pensated 
by annexation of 1-russian Gue lderland , Eastern Fri s i a ,  and the 
county of Bentheims . Belgium ' s  view was summed up by the 
Minister of lnterior , Earon Ue Borchgrave . 
l t  is of the utmost importance for the 
world ' s  peace that a country s o  exposed 
Lo invas ion as te lgium s hould command 
the s i tuation and be made difficult to 
8NYT ,  M�rch 1 5 ,  1919 , p. 1 .  See Appendix I .  
�ttAck . W• are cnnvinced thAt th� 
great povers will examine with aympathy 
an<! justice the eaue� of n nr.tf on which 
sacrificed itaelf in order to remain 
faithful tn it£ en�agernent1 . 9 
At t:he ConferPt�ce , the 'P.ri titb de le�at ion felt that the�r barl 
no power to force a fri�ndly and ncutrft! stnte to ced£ any 
?art of its terr� tory , �hereat the French aupported the � � l g i an 
po1 1 t 1.on s ince A atrong Belgium ,.,as in France ' s  interest .  
The �e.th•rlands were naturally dis turbed by these devel-
opments which put an a ppreci�ble strain on Relgo-�tch relations . 
From Pat"is on t-:•rch 4 ,  Dr. John l.oudon who had served as the 
Fore i 1n Mini1ter of Hol land dur�ng the war stated : 
I t  11 highly regrettable that the Belgi en 
press has taken a hos tile atti tude tnwa!'d 
Holland . I cannot believe this atti tude 
interprets the feelings of a mi llion !e l­
�tans who �oond returu� on ':>utch 10{ l t n 
i914 . 10 
-
What irritated the Dutch Government moat was that Be l g iu� pre-
sented its demands at Paris without first noti fying the Nether-
landa of its deairee and intentions . "nle Dutch felt that the 
Great Powers had no rj ght to interfere in the proble� , but 
Hollarid did sen<l Poref gn Minister van �arnebeek to Fari s on 
May 19 where he r@futed all of Belgium ' s  c laims and allegations . 
qibid. 
10!!!, March 5 ,  1919 , p. 8. 
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Ue did however state that his government waa wi lling to di1-
cue1 with Belgium a pos s ible reviaion of the Treaty of 18 3 9  
but only on the condition that terr1tor:i.al s tatus would not 
be diaturhed. On June 4 ,  1919, the Allied and Aseociated 
Power• rejected Belgium ' •  claim• but at the 1an:1e time reQueated 
that the parti•• of the dispute negotiate a new treaty.  
Belgium' • failure to aeeure territorial gaina from the 
ketherlandt in order to atr:enghten the Belgian front ier cauaed 
Belgium to demand s military alliance or at least co-opera t i ve 
defens@ plannina between the two army ataffa. The Netherland• , 
however, rejected this propoaal on the ground• of her neutrality. 
Therefore , Belgiua vas forced to look elaMrhere for a poaaible 
mili cary all iance , the natural partner in such a pact being 
France. 
At Pari1 , meanwhile , the Treaty of Veraaillea was being 
:>resented in its final form for •ignaturea . Be lg:f.um ind i cated 
its dissatisfaction with the treaty by refuaing to sign and 
c laiming that it denied what wa• due to Belgium. The Belgian 
newapaper Le Soir etated that aa long aa th• treaty did not 
- --
contai.n necesaary condition• for the speedy restoration of 
Be lgium by financial meaauree and a1surance1 of diploma t i c  
support for demand• vital to Be lgian security, i t  was the duty 
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of the government to reject the tt'eaty. 11 Tbe difficulty was 
finally reaolved with Belgium receiving certain financi.al con-
ceaaione and poaaeeaion of the province• of Eupen and Malmedy 
which bad been aaaigned to Pruaaia in 1815 u part of a com-
penaation for Pruaaia'• renunciation of c laima on Saxony. Bel-
gium alao obtAiaed full title to the conteated portion of Moreanet 
and the ve1tem part of Pruaaian Moreene.t . 12 King Albert reacted 
to the final draft by stating: "What would you have? They did 
what they oould . ul3 
As a 1ignatory of the treaty and the gainer of territory 
from Germany, lelaium realized that ahe wa• now a target of 
revi1ioni1t Germany. Belgi.um looked to the Leaaue of Nation• 
for security , but ahe feared that it might prove ineffective . 
'ftaerefore, ahe turned to alliances and attempted to shape her 
foreign policy like that of France and England. 14 In an inter• 
view in October of 192 1  King Albert remarked : 
11 
Above all • • •  we ml18t hope for the 
oontlnuanoe of the intlute union 
between Prance and England which ia 
auled by their eo-on trlala . Belgium, 
for her part , will remain faithful to 
her ar.at brothera in arma and alway• 
work, within the li111it1 of her power, 
NYT. May 6 ,  1919 , p. 1 .  
12A .  landle Elliott, ''The Oale State• and the European 
War". Foreign Polley lteporta , XV (January, 1940) , p .  260. 
l3Cammaerts , p .  325 v 
14�>:4 .• December 7 .  191 9 ,  �· 1 .  
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to strengthen the bond of union betw••y 
the two nation• which guarantee peace . 5 
Diecuaaion1 were begun between France a.nd Belgium re-
garding a military alliance . and on June 15,  1920 , the two 
Chief• of Staff. Marebal Foch of France and General Maglinae 
of Selgium, b•aan military oonversationa which led to the 
a igning of a military pact on September 7 ,  192o . 16 Belgiwn 
al10 attempted to negotiate an agreement vith Great Britain 
to balance the French arrangement . British military author1-
ti•• gave it 1erioua OOG.9idaration. but they finally rejected 
the idu ainc• lrltilh public opinion vaa oppoaed to foreign 
alliancea. 
The following year, on June 12, 1921, Belgium reached 
an . agre ... nt with Luzembourg in which lelgiua bee ... the Grand-
Duchy' •  protector . According to the terma reached , all cua-
toma foraaliti•• between Belgium and Luxembourg were abo111hed 
and in the future , whenever Luxembourg wa1 not represented by 
it• own conaular agent , Luxembourg' •  iatere1t1 would be placed 
in the handa of Belgium' • c0taaular officer• . Abaoat all of 
Luxembourg' •  n ency vu replaced with Belgian currency ,  and 
15 4 Cannaert1 , p.  3 3  • 
16.lrdNr a. Furnia, I!!!. Dipl.Clll&Oz of Ap�aaientf Anglo­
Freach lelatiODa 8lld tbe PrelWfe to World war I�aahlngton , D . C . : 
& bDtvualt1 Pren OTwaahtngtoD. o.c. , i9to), p. 243. 
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Luxembourg was granted a loan of 175 , 000 , 000 franc• from a 
Belgian financial group . They at..o agreed upon the conaolidation 
of their rai lroad ayateu under a aingle administration. Finally, 
a Supreme Council compoeed of five members waa eatabli•hed to 
control the varioua organization• created and ••• to act •• 
a li•i•on between the two government• in execution of tbe agree­
ment . 17 
!!!!. Netberlanda 
After Kaiaer Wi lhelm II ' •  abdication in November of 
1918 be had fled Germany and taken refuae !n the Netherlands . 
The Allied and Aa•ociated fower• d�oded the ex•K•1••r ' •  
aurrender, but the Netherland ' •  refuaed and baaed the ir action 
on the Dutch policy of neutrality. The Dutch failure to extra-
dit• the ez-Jtaleer made the N•therland1 unpopular wi.th the Entente , 
and it waa in this atmoa phere of tension that Belgtum preeaed its 
claim for the caeaion of l>utch territory to Belgium. Belgium 
hoped to take a.dvantage of the situation and poeslbly gain sup-
port from the Great Power• for her posi tion on the matter. 
lt'llllediately after the var. Holland experienced a brief 
ati..ulation of her commercial activity. !ut it wae soon apparent 
17t.eaaue of Nationa T'i'eaty Seriea t Publication of 
Treatiea and International Engagement• t..ziatered vlth the 
Secretariat!! �  League .2f J!ationa , Vol. IX, No .  256 �5 
vola . ;  LOOdon: Harriaon & Soaa , LTD • •  1922) ,  p. 223-245. 
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Fig . 3 Belgian 
. in 1919 Gains 
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that the long years of war had �eakened both her agricultural 
and trade base. Her agriculture was faced with over1ea1 compe­
tition. and her trade was d•pendent upon a Europe devastated 
by war . In other words . Holland ' •  prosperity was in direct 
proportion to Central and Western European economic activity. 
Prior to 1920. Dutch fOTeign policy was characteristi• 
cally pase!ve due to her traditional neutrality. Not being a 
party to th• world war. the Dutch took no active 1>4rt in the 
Peace Conference at Paria . and continued to follow her old 
line. However, an i•portant change in Dutch foreign policy 
took place tu 1920 vben the Netherland• wae admitted to the 
League of Nations . By aaauming member•hip in the world M"gant• 
aation, the Dutch modified their traditional neutrality and 
tended toward• the policy of collective enforcement .  Wi thin 
the ttetherland• , the "idealist•" we11'e atrong oppon•nt1 to this 
ehange of policy. and aa a result, Dutch participation in 
League aftaf.n wu often a cautioua endeavor . As with !elgiwn, 
the ttetherlanda looked to the League of Rations aa the harbinger 
of peace in Europe and in the World . Indeed . a nation who1e 
whole econcmic 1tructur• wa1 supported by trade waa dependent 
upon international peace for it• pro1perity. Moat of her foreign 
policy ••• to be carried out through th• League , and along with 
the other small !uropean 1tates Holland worked for the peaceful 
solution of all interna tional d�. s?Utea . 
Aa lurope approached the 1920 ' •  there was a feeling o t:  
optimism on the part of many European governmenta. The world 
war had been brought to a eucce•sful ccmc lueion from the ·\ l lied 
point of view, Germany lay proatrate and posed no immediate 
threat to the atatua quo, and the League of Nations was launched 
vtth the expectation of establishing c "ideal 0 framework within 
which all future probl ... 1>4ttween atatea would b• dealth with 
in a peaceful manner. 
Before the var , Belgium, Luxembourg , and the Nethe·rland• 
had all followed a policy of neutrality in the realm of inter­
national affairs . Two of theae states , Belgium and Luxembourg , 
had seen their neutrality vtolated in 1914 and now, at the end 
of the war, re-evaluated their international poa ition. Luxem• 
bourg waa too small to completely revise her foreign policy; 
but ahe did form cloaer economic tiea with Belgium while at the 
aame time she put her faith 1.n the League of Nations . Belgium 
turned away from her traditional policy and sought protect i.on 
not only i.n the League but alao through a system of alliances. 
The failure of her neutrality in 1914 had coat the 'Be lgians 
dearly and they were determined that the same experience would 
not be repeated. In face of German reviaioni am , an untested 
League , and Bri tish avoidance of entangling alliances , relgium 
turned to Frsnce , the strongest r.r: t 4 on  in Europ� poa1eased 
with the aspiration of perpetuating Vera a i lles . 
The Netherlands presented a slightly di fferert picture . 
Neutrality had save.d the Dutch nation from the horrors of the 
world war. Since neutrality haJ aerved her i n  the pas t ,  there 
wu no reaaon to doubt it• future '.Talidity . Under this consid· 
era tion . Holland continued to pur.ue her poli cy of neutral i ty 
with one important exception--her entrance into the League of 
Nations. But th1• modification waa due more to Dutch intereat 
in world peace for economic reasons than from any de1perate 
attempt to ineure her future independence and integrity. 
In 1919 Luxembourg had no real choice . Her only hope 
was with neutrality. The Netherland• , for the moat part , con• 
tinued to rely on neutrality aa a fe .. 1ble poltcy, while B�lglum 
d iscarded neutrality in favor of a system of alliance• and terri• 
torial gaine . The outcome of the foreign policies of these three 
atatea waa to prove the aucc••• or fai lure of neutra lity aa a 
valid international conce pt. 
CHAPTER II 
l"liE PERIOD OF FULFILLMENT 
Germany ,  with her open boundarie1 aad her location 
in the heart of Europe, baa alway• taken her geographical con• 
dit ion into cons ideration in developing her foreign policy .  
I t  la precisely thia central location that ia chiefly reaponaJ:­
ble for the diaaaters that have b .. o so frequent in her hiatory . 
The historical obatacle in the growth of the German nation bad 
repeatedly been France , whoa• baaia of foreign policy waa the 
princ i.ple that no a trong power could be allowed to emerge in 
Central Europe . In accordance with thia principle, France had 
alway• been opposed to any attempt at the creation of a u�ited 
Germany. 
The only natural frontiers that Germany had were the 
Alps in the South, and the North Sea and the Baltic Sea to the 
North. Otherwiae, ahe w .. faced with Prance in the We• t ,  and 
Poland and Czechoelovakia (al.90 llu8aia in the paat) in tbe Eas t.  
Under these geographical condition. , her weatern and eaatern 
36 
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borders were her. main concern . She was ideally located as the 
natural bri:ige between the East and the Wes t ,  hut na Erich F 
L .  Kock•Weaer , former German Vice-Chancellor, s t ated in 1930 : 
• • •  Germany must become neither England ' s  
mercenary in her battle againa t Bolshevism, 
nor Russia ' s  accomplice against the �••tern 
por�ere . Germany tm.11 t  discover a political 
formula which makes her a deairable pa{tner 
for the one , aa well aa for the other. 
The Weimar Republic was faced with many problems , both 
on the domest1.c and foreign level.  During its first eighteen 
months of exietence , its foreign pol icy �as charac t•ri?.ed by 
petulant nationalist sabotage of Alli.ed polic iea and demands . 
The nationalists were not the only threat to the young Republic ' s  
international endeavors . The aocf.alis ta were also extreme in 
thei.r demand• and criticiema of the government. All the exist-
ing partf.es , moderates and extremis ta , had the 9ame goal--only 
the mean• were different .  Bot·h the socialists and the nat lon-
alt.at• had the same ultimate objeetivea : to nullify the Pari• 
treaties, to recti.fy the eastern borders , to end Alli.ed occupa-
tion and reparations , to regai.n Germany' s loat !Dili tary power , 
to remove Germany as an "object" of Entente policy and give t.he 
Reich free determination of it• own policy, and to regain Germany ' s  
1Er1ch F. L. Kock-Weser, Germany in the P�•t-War Period 
(Phi ladelphia: Dorrance & Company, Inc .  ,1930) .. p .  i7;'1':"' 
·� ,,, 
pos ition as � gYeAt f>OWAr tn Eur.,·r-� . 2 
Britlltn t in avoi ding mJ.1 1.tery pncts in the period 
immediately fol lowing the war• puraued a policy of " f.n1ular 
i1olation" '*:rhich was revi.tion1at almot t from the start. She 
preferred to see a rapid rec-o'1€ry c1f �rmany l n  order to ensure 
a stable Europe . France , on th� other hand, had suffe� � and 
lost m.ach duri ng the world war and cons idered the Versai lles 
Treaty a1 ita only aource of future security. It was along 
these lines that the French government of Raymond Poincare fol­
lowed a policy of strict adherence to the peace treaties. 
The O.rman policy of fulf1 llment 'ti'SS initieted on May 
10 , 1971, with the accession of Joseph Wi rth aa Chancellor . 
He rftplaced Konstantin Fehrenbach who resigned on May 4. to pro­
t••t the reparation bill �hieh bad been set at 132 bi ll�oo gold 
marks by the Re paration Commission on April 2 7 .  I t  was the 
pos i t ion of Wirth ' •  government that rc1iatance to the A l lied 
demand• w .. fruitle1 1 1  and that riermany ' e  only recourse was to 
carry them out as t>.1t possible . In the Reicha tag on July 7 ,  
192 1 ,  Walter Rathenau , who was in charge of the Mini1try for 
Reconatruction, declared: 
We germane are obligated by our own 
2 Pinson, p. 423. 
s 1 :r.att·rt , by t!�c honr-r of our naoE 
that we have placed under the treaties . 
�·!� will fu lfi ll and ws will go to the 
limi t of our abi lity i n  order to preserve 
the honor of our na� , which $t&nds mffix�d 
to the treatiea , and ....,. iecognize their 
bi.nding chgracter even though they de not 
expre•• our wishe• . 3 
Thie policy waf' later continued by Gustav Stresemenn an.! Wi lhelm 
Marx after a abort disruption of i t  by the Cuno government from 
1922 to 1923. 
tt was tn January of 19?? that the German Fore i �  ¥.in11-
try wae di•cu••ing the advantage• of an eaatern as opposed to a 
western orf.entation of the Republ i c ' •  forei.gn policy, a debate 
whi ch had exi•ted ever since v�raaillea in 1919 . !lor the moat 
part, the moderate• favored t! west•rn orientat f.on �"h•rea1 the 
left-wing rad i.cal1 , a lar�e proportion of th� nat f on sl i s t1 ,  and 
aome important mi litary figures demanded s rapprocbeID&nt � i tb 
Soviet Ru1e i a .  4 General Hans von Seeckt ,  ,.,bo headed the ad'1-.o-
catea of an eaatet"n policy, point�d 01Jt that another war with 
bad a conmon aim: the extinction of Poland an.d the r4!storation 
of the frontiers of 191 4 .  Rues t. a wa� a t>Oten t i 3 1  "lly snd the 
Republic could he lp develop their industries •• a 1ource for 
3walther Rath9nau, Geaanaelt• &eden (Berlin , 1924) . 
p. 211, cited by Pinaon , p.-Z29 . 
4 Halperin, p .  207. 
future a.run war material. But the mo.t iaportaot common de-
noraioacor vu the de• ir•d deac.-uction of Poland. 
, A• early •• August of 1918, tile poe•ibility �f future 
eooaoaic and mili�ary agra ... at• betwHn Soviet &is� i• and 
Ge�J bad 'beea diaeu.ted b1 Adolf Joffe , Soviet Ambassador- - t o  
Berlia. and a gmup of O.rmaaa which 11\cluded even OU.tav 
Stree .... na.5 By 1921, firm contact had �n eatabliahad be• 
tween th• lleichavebr and Moecow. OQ May 6, 1921, 1lu1aian-
Genan n laciona were turi:IMnd by cha signing of a German-llu•aian 
Cowrcial Agn.•ot. 
ln Api.-11 of th• fol lowiq year, �irth and lathanau vent 
to Genoa to atteQd an iotarnational acoaomie conference . On the 
aixteanth. in nea.t»y M.apallo, they coao luded a tr·eaty of friendahi.p 
with Oeorghy Chicbarine, tbe Soviet Foreign Miaiater. ly thia 
agreement the two aontract1na parci .. a1reed to re•eatablisb 
nOl'llAl diplomatic and oonaular relation• , tbe7 agreed to a mutual 
ceaumoution of nparation c laiu, and Germany c:onaented �o waive 
r.ault of tbe abolition of private property in Ruaaia. 'nle 
pact waa 1tren1thene4 by the appointment of bitterly anti•Prench 
Count Ulrl.ch voa Brookdorf f ·llantsau •• German Ambuedor to the 
Se. J .  P••••t . ! Shott Hi•tm !!, 2,!rmariy (C&mbr1.dge: 
University Pr .. • r  1960) , p .  165. Stresemann was the leader of the 
German People ' s  Party at this time and later Chancellor in 1923 . 
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Soviet Union. 6 
The Allied Power• ' firat i-eaction to th• treaty wa• 
one of anger and fear. Hoa t Gena• •  however, vined the 
pact favorably and hoped that Germany ' •  bargaining poaition 
with the Allied Power• would thereby be ilDproved. Unknown to 
all govermmenta , Germany and l.ueeia ahortly thereafter concluded 
a aecret treaty vhicb waa of great atgn:lficance in the develop-
meat of the German and luaaian anai•• · '11\e agreement waa not 
aigned on th• governmental level, and it allowed German officer• 
to gain ex,.r1ence in Rueaia; in return, lluaeia received a ati-
pulated sum annually and the luaaian Army wae to be trained by 
German experts . 
In 1922 Germany faced a aerioua international criaia 
resulting fram her failure in meetina reparation payments . The 
Genao Government had managed to carry on the nation ' •  economic 
etruoture during the previoua few year• through foreiga loans 
and other arrana ... nta. For exAlmple, ill July. of 1921, the 
Republic had D9IOtiated a 40,000 ,000 gold marke loan from 
Bolland. 7  
The Netherland• had more than juat a pa••ing intere•t 
in makina a loan to Germany. An economically sound and 
6 Ibid. , p. 167 . 
7NYT, July 23, 192 1 ,  p .  3. 
-
42 
proaperoua Germany vaa ••••ntial to Dutch c01111.Mtrical activity. 
Lying at the mouth• of th• Rhine , Meuae , and Scheldt rivers 
and connected by a eyatem of canal.a , nuch of Germaay ' a  coaa.rce 
paaaed through Dutoh outl•t• eucb aa httudam. Prior to the 
world vu, trade relation• between the 1'etherland• and Germany 
had ben oloae, and the collapee of the German ec:onom1 follow• 
ing the Reich'• defeat ••• a aerioue blow to Dutch com.neree. 
Tbn'efon , Bolland deaired a quiok reatoratioa of Gerun •conomic 
power in �rder to further Duteh trading intereata . 
B•laiua vaa alao inter••ted in Oerman conaereial acti• 
vity du• to the Belgian port at Antwerp and to its claim of 
reparation• . However, the Belgian• were more cautioua in their 
view toward• a ncovered Germany. Belgium' • official attitude 
in regarda to Germany can be1t be ex .  plif ied by reference to 
a propoae4 Analo-Belgian treaty in the first montha of 192 2 .  
The treaty ... never actually concluded becau.• of Belgium ' •  
complaint that "it ia not apeoifically directed againet Germany. 
but can be evoked againat any poeeible violation of th• inte• 
grity of Belgian terrltory. "8 rrom the !elglan point of view. 
the propo•ed cenditiona would con.etitute Belgium aa equivalent 
8v1acount D ' Abernon , The R!!!2 of an Ambu1ador, Vol.  I :  
Veraaille• to 1.a'illo. 1920•1Jtf �en-city: Doubleday ,  Doran, 
i Company, lnc . ,  930) . p.  260. 
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to a British protectorate rath•r than give her the protection 
•he de1ired. 
'!be economic s ituation in Germany had b9Come so critical 
that in July of 1922 the German Government requeated a two-year 
moratorium of it• reparation payment• in order to avoid a f inan• 
cial crash. The following August , the Alli•• met in London to 
discuss the matter. Great Britain, Italy, and even Belgium 
1upported the German position. but France refuaed to yield . In 
November a new aetch cabinet waa formed by Wilhelm Cuno, an 
econOUlic eJCpert , in ho1>9• of remedying the problem and imp1:ov­
ing relation• with France. But France wa1 reluctant to accept 
any German overture du. to the recent development at tapallo. 
Aa the diapute vaa not resolved, Prance claimed that Germany 
had defaulted on her reparation payments, and Franco-Belgian 
troops moved into the Ruhr on January 1 1 ,  192 3 .  
With active reai1tance to the new development out of 
the question for a disarmed Germany, the German Government pur­
eued a policy of paaaive re• iatance and dec lared that there could 
be no 1ettlement of the controver.1 until the 'Ru� had been evacu­
at•d. Prance refuaed and aa a reault Cuno reaigned on August 1 2 ,  
1923. Guatave Streaemann replacal Cuno , but be failed to alleviate 
the financial situation and vaa followed by Wilhelm Marx in 
November of 1923. 
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A• lelgiUt'll relied on rraiaee for the protection of 
Belgian independence and territorial i.ntegrlty, the amall 
natioa had to auppoTt the French move into the Ruhr . Premier 
Theunia etated on April 1 6 ,  1923: 
Belgium is resolved to r ... tn by the a ide 
of France in the Ruhr until complete aatia­
faction of lel3ium ' •  juat clai• has been 
obtained . 9 
The Dutch, •• could be expected, took an unfavorable att i tude 
toward• the whole epiaode . Belgium ' •  attempt to appropriate 
Dutch territory at the end of the world war had not been for• 
gotten, and regardleaa of French and Belgian aaaurancea that 
the right• of the Metherlande would be reapected, the Dutch 
Government became increaaingly 1keptical aa French and Belgian 
troop• moved nearer to the Dutch frontier. Everywhere in Rolland 
maaa meetings were held to proteat the l.uhr occupation. The 
Miewue Rotterd ... obe Caurant refered to th• rranco•le lgian 
action aa "an unl•ful oceupatlon of the Rhine front in time 
of peace for reaaona of etrategic aafety . "10 
R.eparationa being the crwc of the problem, an internation-
al committee of ezpert• waa appointed by the Reparation Commi ssion 
to reaolve the difficulty. Headed by Charle• G .  Dawe• .  the well-
9J!!I. April 1 7 ,  192 3 ,  p. 2 .  See Appendix II . 
lONYT. February 28 . 1923 , p. 3 .  
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known financ ier, the conaittee met on January 2 1 ,  1924, and 
rec0111aended the reatoration of full economic and fiscal sover-
eignty to Germ.any. At the time of thia rec�ndation, the 
eituation vae temporarily .• being handled through the MICUM 
(Miseion Interalliee de Controle dea Uein•• et Min••) treaty 
between the auhr induatrialist1 and the occupational authoritie•. 
It had been aig8ed on November 23, 1923 , and provided for a 
temporary regulation of reparations until April 5 ,  1924 . 11 
Ge'rmany gave an affirmative answer to the Dawea report , and the 
"Dawes plan " ,  a1 it became l<nown , wu dec lared to be in opera-
tion on September 1 ,  1924; followed by the withdrawal of French 
and Belgian troope from the Ruhr. Belgium, however, made it 
cleu that 1he expected Germany to fulfill her obligations . On 
January 1 ,  1924, King Albert declared: 
Regulation of the reparation que1ti.oo • • •  
ia indiapeneable for the reeatabli1hment 
of our economic equilibrium. '11\e legiti­
macy of reparation• baa been recogniz ed 
by tbe whole world, including Germany herself . 12 
A step toward• improvement of German•B•lgi.an rel4t1on1 
vu taken on April 4 ,  1925, with the conclusion of the German• 
lelgian Trade Accord . The agreement wu baaed on the favored 
1
1nenry Ashby Turner, Jr. , 
of th• Weimar R.epubli.c (Princeton : 
1963). p. 125. 
Stre1emann and the Poli tic• --�--- - -Princeton Uoiveraity Pres a ,  
12J!Ir., January 2 ,  1924 , p. 1 9 .  
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nation t>rinciple and affected particularly German trade in 
the Belgium Congo and Belgian mandated territoriea . 
The same month, a new agreement between Belgium and 
the Netherlanda for the regulation of the que1tion of the Scheldt 
was reached. On May 22, 1926 , France, Great Britain, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands signed a protocol registering the termina· 
t ion of the Treatiea of 1839. The Belgian parliament approved 
a new treaty in July, but in the Netherland• it waa bitterly 
opposed by a group who felt it threatened Dutch national inter­
eata . On October 29, 1926 , it paaaed the Second Chamber by the 
narrow margin of fifty to forty-seven , but only by the firm and 
eloquent defense of the treaty by Foreign Miniater Van Karnebeck . 13 
How�ver, on March 24 , 192 7 ,  the First Chamber defeated it by a 
vote of thirty-three to seventeen. 14 A• a reault , Belgo-Dutch 
relations reached their loweat point during the period between 
the two world wara. A majority of the Dutch desired good rela­
tions with Belgium, but Holland dialiked the Franco-Belgo all:t.ance 
and feared that through an arrangement with Belgium, the Nether• 
lands might become involved in the age-old conflict between France 
and Germany. 
13vandenboach , p. 264 . 
14 Ibid . , p .  265. 
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One o f  the moat important ateps t�ken by the nations 
of Europe during this period was the Conf erenc� of Europ�an 
Nation• held at Locarno, Switzerland. Great Pritain, Prance ,  
Italy, !elg1wr., Germany, Poland and Czecho• lovakia took part 
in the proeeedtngs . Theee nations collectively guaranteed the 
maintenance of the territorial s tatua quo resulting from the 
Treaty of Versailles and that differences between the s i gn.a-
tories which could not be 1ettled by diplomatic means were to 
be refered to either an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent 
Court of International Juettce at the Hague . 
The Geneva Protocal of 1924 bad called for the outlawing 
of aggresftion, but prior to the Locarno Conference its fate waa 
still in suapenee . On March 9 ,  192 5 ,  P'oretgn Minister Paul 
Rymana of. E� lgium s ta�ed hi• nati on' s  position: 
Ever since the Armiatice I have shown 
that an entente of the we•t•rn pc·vera 
was tndiapensable in ord�r to secure a 
•table and peaceful Europe .  The security 
of Belgium ia to the common interest of 
Prance . and Britain. The idea of a weatern 
pact ha• gained grtJund . The probl�m of 
1ecur1ty i s  today solemnly poaed before 
the conscience of the nations and whatever 
difficulties i t  involve• , none,. .can escape . 
The idea i• under way a.nd it i.a impossible 
it should not end in a solution being found . 15 
15NYT, March 9 .  192 5 .  p .  5 �  
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The Locarno Treaties were signed on October 1 6 ,  192 5 ,  
and according to the �erman Minister o f  Foreign Affairs , "Locarno 
stood for security and peace in Euro pe . I t  foreshadowed no hos­
tile designs against anyone . 11 16 Even more , Locarno signified 
the creation of a new psychological atmosphere in Europe , and 
new ir.teroationsl conditions in general. It represented an 
attempt to arrive at a moral disarmament , , a. new. moral consolidation , 
and also political and economic consolidation. Locarno was a 
hope for the future . 
The Locarno Treaties were hailed in Belgium and on 
January 2 1 ,  1926, the Belgian Chamber of Deputies adopted the 
pact by a vote of 124 to four with four abstentiona . 17 For 
Belgium, the new treaty di minished the risk of German aggreasion 
hy a rlet�iled and extens ive arbitration convention providing for 
the settlement of all non-political ques tions . Also important 
was the recognition by all the Powers concerned of territorial 
status C1UO and the inviolab ility of the frontier separating 
France and �elgium from Germany. 
In Germany the German signature to the Locarno pact 
brought on a cabinet crisis , and Dr. Hans Luther who had replaced 
Marx in December of 1924, was forced to resign because of 
16Halperin, p .  338 . 
17 NYT , January 2 2 ,  1 9 2 6 ,  p .  5 .  
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nationali.st Of>p0 � i t i on to the Government ' s  entering :!.. nto any 
agreement that �uould fetter her from regaining in the future , 
by any means , territory she � laimed rtghtfully be lonaed to her. 
When no other cabfnet could be formed , r:>r. Luther 'returned to 
his former pCBt :ind recei\7ed a ''ote of confi"en�e on January 27 , 
1926.  In �aptern1'er , '}ermany was admitted to the 'Le11gue of Nations . 
As in the previous few years , Gustav Stresemann w�a appoint-
erl as �intster of Foreign Affai r� . Earlier in his life , Stresemann 
had been an outspoken and committed nationali.s t ,  but he later 
recognized Get'm.any' s peri.lous s i tuation and supported the policy 
of fu lfil l�ent . During the French and Be l�ian occupation of 
the Ruhr. , �tre�emann ended the policy of pass ive resistance and , 
as a result , w�s as sailed by the patriotic press . He re plied :  
� am  prepared and happy • . .  to take my 
s tand before any tribunal to defend 
what I have done . • •  . r:aving up pass ive 
res is tance is perhaps more patriotic 
than the phrases with which it is 
combated. I knew when I d id it . . .  
that I was putting my own poli ti.cal 
posit ion in my party--yes , even my 
life--in J eopardy. But what is it that 
we Germans lack? We lack the courage 
to take responsibility. 18 
As Fore ign Minister, Stresemann aimed his policy at brea�ing the 
encirclement of Germany by securing the frten:1 ship of England 
and, if possible, of France . This he cons idered essential in 
11\tartin Gohring , Stresemann , Mensch, Staatsmann , Europaer: 
Gedenkrede , gehalten .!!! �· Juli 1956 ijl{ainz: 1956), s p  • •  1 9 £ . , 
c i ted in Gordon A .  Graig , From Bismark !£_ Adenauer : Aspec ts Of 
German Statecraft (Baltimore : The John Hopkins Pres s ,  1 958) , p .  7 2 .  
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order to �tf�ct the evacua t i on ef the Rh:f.nelan.1 nt the earliest 
poa s f  ble date , �nd to �chf eve a reeaonet le and finel s � t t l ement 
of the repa�ati one problem . Only �hen th�'e aims h�d bern 
achieved , and or.1� wher. Germeny had re1UJ'fle� �er r l ac �  J n  the 
coune i l1 of F.urope could the prob 1 �£ of rev� s i on o f  thr. eastern 
front1ttr he epr>roeehed �·'� th 3ny hoptt of sueeess . ! n  "'.1"ork t n g  
toward• theall! objectives , StresP.mann had three natural !!ni 
vAluable gi tt� . He had thf' abi1 i ty to sense 1enx.�r end to avoid 
i t  by s�< �ing and r@tfttnJng t�e ini t iative; he coul� msintair. 
his perepect i v• �nd his �ense of v�lues in the �i d s t  of a 
changing di plOP'atf.c s :f.tuation ;  ttni:! finally, he T_,,as more s t'ubborn 
thttn h h t  rertners in ne�o t i a t � ons and he refust'd to a l low the i r  
importuni ti e s  t o  force b1IP to accept secor.d·best e o l u t i ons . 1 9 
FTom the end of the �1orl1 �Yar unti.1 1914 , Frsnc� waa 
governed by e, ri.ght i1t party which followed .i !ltrong-han.d policy 
in regard• to Germany. The �overnment of Ravmond Poi nc:!re coo-
•idered the !'!:aintenance of the peac:-e s�ttl it'Tle r. t  the· anch·"r of 
bet' s ecurf.ty pt'ogratr; she t'et�i ned her snr.�m•n ts , :ian i pulated 
th@ Lettl.l\le of !-'ation1 , and ttrov• to preserve int�ct the vie-
torious eoi! l i t i on of the war. Th• Yrench al so �trove to create 
an e laborete alliance system in C•-'ntra l Eas tern ?t1rope , thus 
1 S .-. *· ·1· "'  P 7 ' .. �,,. ... ... ..... . .  1 .., . 
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th• formation in 1921-22 of the Little Entente between Czeeho-
a lovakia, Romania , and Yugoa lavta to preveat the re1toratioa of 
the Rap1burga in Hungary and Au1tria, and to in1ure atrict comp­
liance by Hungary of the Treaty of Trianon. B•1ide1 the Pranco­
Be lgo treaty of 1920 , the Prencb alao a igned a military agree­
ment with Poland on February 19 of the 1aae year. On January 
2 5 ,  1924, France and Czechoslovakia concluded a pact to concert 
upon meuures relating to thef.r 1eeurity and the peace treaties 
and to conault in case G�rmany and Auatria tried to consummate 
the Anachluaa or in case monarchi1t re1torationa were attempted 
in Hungary and in the Reich. 
In the l"rench election• of May 1924, a new lefti1t 
government under Ari1tide !riand waa put into office . Thia 
new governmeat brought in a period of conciliation in regards 
to Qermany. However , l"rance concluded another pact in June of 
1926 with Romania to consult with each other in caae of unpro­
voked attack and to aubmit all diaputea to arbitration. In 
November of the next year a aimilar agreement waa reached with 
the lingdom ot Yugoalavia. Even a1 German-French relations were 
beginning to improve , France 1tlll c lung to her policy of all i ances 
for eecurlty. 
Prior to the world depreaaion relat ions among moat of 
the European nation• v•r• improving. In May of 1926 Germany and 
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the Netherland• entered into negotiations for a pact agatn•t 
war. Holland wa• alway• avai lable for any type of arrangement 
which would be in the in�reate of international peace. Bel• 
gium, which waa having extr9me financial difficultiea f.n 192 5 ,  
was contacted by the German Government through the Pre•ident 
of the Re ich9bank with an offer to help revalorize the millarda 
of worthleaa German Nrb left in Belgium by the German Army of 
Occupation . 20 Belgium quickly rejected the offer eince the 
propoeal alao called for the return of Eu"8n and Mal.medy •• 
compenaatton to Germany. The economic a t.tuation woraened and 
finally on July 13 , 1926 , Premier Jaapar a•ked the Chamber te 
give ling Albert an extenaioa of power for aix montha in order 
to deal with the problem. In December of 1927 the Belgian 
Government began studying the poaaibility of decreaa ing the 
size of the Be lgian army due to the financial crtaia , but Premier 
Jaa par reiterated that the Government would continue to vork for 
international pacification conducted by previou1 Government• 
under the auapioe• of the League of Mationa and tn th• epirit 
of the Locarno agre ... nt• . 21 
roreip relation• between Belgium and Germany vere at lll 
20 NYT ,  July 24 , 1926 , p. 3 .  -
21!Jl1 December 1 .  192 7 ,  p.  2 .  
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not at their beet. On February 16 , 1927 ,  the Belgian Defense 
Minieter , M. de Broqueville, diacloaed in the Chamber of Deput-
iea , that Germany was spending huge awna of money on rebuilding 
her army. As if a voice from the future , he stated: 
1 warn you that the German war theory 
now, aa before the war, involve• swift 
attack and the occupation of a large 
portion of Belgium. The war tomorrow 
will above all be one of induatry and 
chemicals . 
Belgium today is completely open to 
invaaion and her a ituation ie ve�2 
much more criUical than in 1914. 
A further strain in German-Belgian relations occurred in May 
of 1928 , when Germany refused to build two mail boats for the 
Ostend•Oover service aa part of the R.eich' • reparation payments . 
Germany claimed it was too buay at the time building her own 
commercial fleet . 23 
Belgian-Dutch relatione were dealt a a.-vere blow in 
February of 1929 by the publication in the Utrecht•cb Dagblad 
{a leading Dutch provincial newapaper) of alleged proviaiona 
in a eecret Franco-Relgian military treaty s igned in iq20 .  The 
interpretation of the treaty preaented in the newapaper refered 
to Rolland and the po•aibility of war operation• on Dutch 
22
!!!!., February 17 , 192 7 ,  p .  5.  
23NYT, May 20,  1928, p. 2.  
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t �rritory. Both France and Belgium denied such a provis ion 
and C",eneral Gallet , Chief of the P,.elg1.an C".eneral Staff, re-
marked: "I should like to state categorically that the doc�n� 
is a forgery from beginning to end . u24 
In Germany there wae an indf.gnant reaction to the treaty 
incident .  Baron von hetag-Loringhofen, a member of the Reich· 
stag uaed the opportunity to attack Streaemann ' •  conci llatery 
foreign policy. 
!>r .  Stresemann expecta us to sit dawn 
quietly • • •  with people who have conapired 
only lately for a vi olent attack on our 
country, while little Holland , likewiae 
threatened , hravely demand• explanations • •  
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Dr .. Stre1emann talks before the party 
caucua , fight• for a great coalition and 
f ! ghts for his portfolio, but he does not 
fight for Germany ' •  poaition in the world 
nor for Germany' •  security. On thoae 
aubj ects he keepe ailent, becaua• be would 
have to con�!
•• the utter bankruptcy of 
hi• policy. 
On the domestic ecene , the Reich enjoyed a period o f  
comparative recovery and proaperity from 1924 to 1928 . Thia 
improvement had been brought about by foreign loans which not 
only terved to create an illua ion of proeperity, but al10 made 
it po1sible for the Jleich to meet and tranafer reparation paymenta . 
24!!!,. March 3,  1929, p . 9 .  
25NYT. March 1 ,  1929, p .  8 .  
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An elec t i on on May 20 , 19?8 , resulted in a sub�tantial v i c tory 
for the Social Democrats and a setback for the rightists. 
At this time, an attempt was made to revise the Dawe� 
P '.an. From the German �oint of view , its principle shortcoming 
was its failure to set the total reparation b i l l .  Therefore , in 
September of 1928 , representati ves of Fran c e ,  Germany, Great 
Britain, Belgium, and Italy met at Geneva to discuss the prob-
lem. The League Council met at Lugano ,  Switzerland , in December 
of the same year and chose Ow�n D .  Young of the United State• 
to head A committee of experts in searching for a final solution. 
Finally, on June 7 / 1929 , Germany accepted the ''Y"'1ng Plan" 
which called for her to make payments over a period of fifty-
nine years. 
Belgium had been highly critical of the negotiations 
which took place at Lugano. The proposed plan called for a 
reduction in Belgium ' s  reparation c laims from $114 , 000,000 to 
26 $64,000,000 . Belgium and Germany argued out their differences 
concerni.ng the worthless German money left in Belgium in 1918 , 
and the German Government announced ita willingness to make a 
monetary refund but requested some sort of political or terri-
torial compensation. 
26NYT M _, .ay 
The lelgiana refused to listen to any talk of 
9 ,  1929 , p .  4 .  
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revision. The �eich then offered to settle in return for two 
ports of call to s erve as German coaling s t ations . Belgium also 
balked at this proposal. 
Emile Francqui , the chief Belgian delegate , was besieged 
by the other representatives with promises of future justice i f  
only he would make concessions. Refering to the promises made 
to Belgium ever since 1919 , Francqu:J. sai d ,  " . . .  I have now come 
to prefer cash to promises . "27 The problem was finally resolved, 
however, by promi.a ing Belgium that until the Be lgian c laim was 
settled, the Young sys tem of payments would not enter into 
operat ion . 
Another important agreement under consideration in 19?.8 
and 1.S:?S '·:E.s the Gener2l Act for the :!?ac ific Settlement of In­
ternat:i.onal Di s putes which called for the renunciation o f  war 
as an instrument of international politics . Basical ly ,  the 
agreement provided (1) that each pair of s ignatories should 
set up a permanent conciliation c onm1ission; (2) prescribed the 
1ubmies ion of all legal disputes to the Permanent Court o f  
International Jus tice whose decis ion was binding; (3) prescribed 
the submis s ion of non-legal disputes to a c ommittee of arbi­
trators ; and (4) provided that members of the League of Nations 
27 
NYT.-� . , May 1 7 , 19 2 7 , p . 3 . 
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could subscribe to one or more chapters of the Act and �oc.ld 
make reservationa exc luding particular categoriee of diaputea 
frOll'I tho•• to be dealt with under the Act.  Belgium accepted 
the Ac t in it• entirety whereaa Holland 1ubecribed only to 
the fir•t two pointa . 
�ermany ! a  international s i tuation improved greatly 
during the 19?0 ' s .  l!(Jwever , a gt--neral dissatisfaction with the 
cour1e of evP n t s  existed in the thoughts of SOUie Germana . In 
192 9 ,  Otto Hoetzsch, a c.:ember of the Reich9tag, wrote: 
':"hE Gt·rtMn Rt· ich f.s today J1·.r.us··heade:! . 
It i1 •till a defeated and a fettered 
E tate. which does not po••••• lta 
1overeignty in full meaaure and is not 
� pet!t· emor..& pe ers ;  and yt·t ,  aa t•&a1:da 
luropean politics , people make of it a 
Grr.at Powe.r, a peer al!:ong peers , -.;,:>1:�:ing 
with the other state• in re•toring order 
t� Luropean affair1 , and for that purpoae 
an eaaential unit. 'l1tua we are faced with 
this s trange paradox of a Jreat Po\1f:!r which 
i1 not a Great Power . 28 
As Germany P••••d into what waa to be the concluding 
year• of the Weimar Republic , ita foreign policy was atill fun-
damentally the aame--to rid the Reich of the Treaty of Veraai lle• . 
to regain her lost territories , and to achieve the statu• of an 
internat ional power . The policy of fulfillment was only a means 
28otto Hoetzech, Germany' • Domeatic and Foreign Policies 
(London i Yale University Preas ,  1929). p .  7� 
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to th! a ene and h ad ,  for the 11.c,st part , pro'\ted a f a !. lur•. "!:he 
and the !aar ; bet along �itb theaE two araaa c onsidered of 
gr�•t economic end strat�gic i.:llportance by Gern�ny there could 
have been added Eupan and Malmedy. 
�t• taking of �upen-Matm.1y was unm i t igated 
robbery and muat be revokad. 29 
29 "och-Weaer, p. 212. 
CBAPl'Ell III 
TRI DEPUSSIOll ARD TB! RISI OF BITLER 
A• early aa the beginning of 1929 Germany began to 
feel the impact of aerioua economic difficulti•• · Belgium and 
Holland faced the same situation. but their coloni•• helped 
cuahion the blow of world wide depreaaion. However. a1 trading 
nation9 they a t i ll auffered under the general economic collapse. 
Their c0111Dercial relation• with Germany in 1928 were of apecial 
concern to the Lowland atatee a inee 3 . 8 per cent of Belgium's 
import trade and 4 . 1  par cent of her export trade waa with the 
Reich, wberea1 Bolland had S . l  per cent and 9 . 8 per cent reapeetive­
ly. 1 More than two billion guilder• , inv••t•d in Dutch loans 
to Germany . were b locked and virtually loa t. When Germany waa 
forced to put reatrictiona on the tran•fer of money to foreign 
countri•• in 1931. the backbone of the Dutch economic 11.fe was 
broken. 
Economic nationaliam was an offapring of a di1torted 
1Jamea w .  Angell, The Recovery of Germany (Re-v Raven : 
Yale Univerait7 Pr•••• 192'9')7 p .  4o3. --
59 
60 
politf.eal natlonali1s, and tu growth, etimulatad by the de-
pn.1ion, impeded th• couree of international co-operation. 
Tariff barrien , quotaa 1 reooune to the barter •79tea, currency 
and credit rutriotione , •d tM coll•P9• of the gold atandard 
all contrU,uted to the awa1ums.na of Monomi-e n.ationali.1111 in 
tbe late 1920'• aocl early 19SO ' • ·  A• a reeult, the e.maller 
atat•• of IUl'Ope deeided eo take the initiative and mt in Oslo, 
Sweden, in Decembft of 1930. On December 22 the O.lo Conve·ntion 
which provided f• • acon•ie entente with Denmark , Norway, 
Sweden , the .. therland1 , lalgiua, ud Luxeabourg vu concluded . 
rtaland joined the group in 1933. The Convention WU buically 
a policy of oo-operation with othe# •t•t•• for reatoring the 
balance of economic aed political power, preventiq tb• 1radual 
aba•ption of ... 11 nation• t.y their a tronge1." neighbon 1 and 
averttq poaelble eonfllcta . War che .. tberland• and Luxembourg 
lt n�ented a ohaaoe to improve U. international economic 
and political eltuation while atlll following a rigid 1apartial1ty. 
l'n l•lai•• however , lt waa an f.aportant revenal of heT po•t­
war rranoophile poliey.2 
he to the hoetility of the Great 'Powera . the O.lo Con-
vention pTOVed rather f..neffectift in regards to curbing the rise 
2 . . 2 t:./lt. llliot, roreisa Pol.toy a.mt• , XV, No .  l ,  p .  2Q\it. 
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of economic nationalum. On June 20. 193 2 . King Albert o f  
Belgium. in a letter to hi• Prime Minister M .  Jtenkin , wrote : 
It baa thua been definitely proved that 
no country 11 able, by itaelf. to alter 
in ita favor the aoune of econcaic 
evolution. A concerted action of the 
Stat•• toward• international aolidarity 
can alone cure the grave evi la from which 
dMt world 1a suffering • • • •  
It eeema to me that Belgium 1hould not 
hesitate to take the initiative vbiah 
circumetancea require , and to aecure 
to thU. end th• help of the Stat•• which� 
like our country , feel keenly the nece11ity 
of a change in economic policy. 3 
'l1\e very next day it waa announced that the �·• government• 
of Belgium. Lux-1>ourg • and Holland would form an economic 
union to help allievat• the European economic aituation. The 
meeting bad taken place in Ouchy. a 1uburb of Lauaanne , Switzer-
land , and the reaulting Convention of Oucby provided for a re­
duction of tariff• between the three Lowland statea . 4  However, 
Great Britain later inaiated on benefitins from th••• tariff 
reductiocaa beaauae of her moat•favored-nation aar ..... nt.a and 
thi• d .... nd practically DUllified the Convention . 
In Germany, Heinrich Bruening replaced Mueller •• 
Chancellor on Marob 30. 1930 . On April 1 he preaented the three 
3 c .... erta . p. 330-331. See Appendix III • 
4!!!I. June 21. 193 2 ,  p. 5. 
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main objective• of hi• government ' •  diplomacy: (1) loyal 
fulfillment of exi•tioa agreement• • (2) c larification and 
development of Germa.ny '  a relati� vi th thoae state• that were 
friendly to her, and (3) encouragement of international co­
operation, eapecially 1n the economic field , in order to allie­
vat• Germany' •  .. terial hardabipa . Bruening ·�,.. determined 
to brook ao interference on the part of the lleichetag u he 
put bi.a program into effect; and be favored government by decree 
before that expedient bad proved to be neceaaar, . " 5 
The nift deterioration of the country' •  ecoaoaaic aitua­
tioa meanwhile led President Hindenburg and Chancellor Bruening 
to put a fi.nmc ial program into effect by meaoa of emergency 
decree• on July 16, 1930 . For the firat time aince the founding 
of the llepubllc, the principle of miniaterial reapon•ibility had 
been violated. The Preaidential election of May 13. 193 2 ,  atrength• 
aoed the poaition of the rightiat elementa , especially the Nazia . 
A• a result , Bruenina wa1 aaked to reaiga and Colonel Franz von 
Papen, a fifty-year old ariatocrat became the new Chancellor on 
May 31 .  
On the international aceoe an important confereace opened 
5 Graig, p.  85. 
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in Lauaanne , Switzerland , oa  June 16 , 1932.  The Von Papen 
Government demanded complete cancellation of reparation pay-
mente . France wanted the Young P lan formally continued but 
admitted that the payment• would have to be draa t1cally reduced. 
It vu at this aame meeting that the Convention of Ouchy was 
negotiated . Oo July 9 a compromi•• waa reached by which the 
cr•ditor etatea agre•d to diecard th• Young Plan in return for 
a promise by Germany to pay three billion gold mark• in�o a 
general fund fo.. European recoaatruction. \1lus the Laueanne 
••ttlement became the la•t in the aerie• of Allied receaaion.a 
from the claima originally made upoa Germany. 
In the elections of July 31, 1932 , the Maaia captured 
230 •••t• in the lleichatag, making them the eingle largest group 
even tbou&h they failed to get a majority. The following Noventber 
17 Von Papen reaigned and wu aucceaded by General Kurt von 
Schleicher who 1.aated until January 28. 1933. Von Schleicher ' •  
view of � Nazi• waa fairly well expr••••d in a letter to the 
new Cbancellor from Major von Fumetti. 
However. if the Rational Socialist movement 
were judged only by it• nebuloua aims , ita 
dubioua programme . and ita inferior leadera , 
a devaetating judgement would have to be 
reached. But even ao, the fact cannot be 
denied that e leven million German voter• 
demona trate in their dark loaging a 1trong 
national vtll to live , and for tbi1 and 
•••k n.w fonu . To me it appear• the moat 
important tuk of future etateeraft to find 
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these forma and to capture the ideas 
of the movement for the stat e .  Only 
a personality with complete intellectual 
freedom will be able to achieve this . 
Hence I am convinced that you, Herr General , 
whom I admire so much ,  will master this 
diffic,,lt task with a firm hand • • •  6 
An historic conference took place between Adolf Hitler 
and President Hindenburg on January 4 ,  193 3 ,  and ended with a 
rapproachment between the two men. At noon on January 30 , 1933 , 
Hindenburg administered the oath of office to the new and last 
Chancellor of the Weimar Republic . 
German-Belgium relations during the last years of the 
Republic were s trained in some instances . In 1929, Belgium was 
s triving to become the future site for the Bank of International 
Settlements in order to establish an international ins titution 
on Belgian territory as a possible deterrent to future invasion 
by another state. In November of that year , the Belgian Govern-
ment proteated that the German delegates blocked a favorable 
vote to Belgium by political arguments . 7 The bank was eventually 
set up at Basal and Belgium withdrew her protest but an unamiable 
atmosphere remained. 
In March of 1931 Belgium protested against a vote taken 
61.iajor Von Fumetti to Schleicher, Munich 5 April 1932:  
Nachlab Schleicher, No . 6 3 ,  Bundeaarchiv Koblenz. cited in F .  L.  
Cars ten , The Reichawehr and Politics : 1918 to 1933 (London:  Oxford 
Univers itY-Prea s ,  196�) ,� 367. 
---
7!!!.,, November 1 1 ,  1929 , p .  6 .  
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in the Reichstdg urging the German Government to ••ia• any 
opportunity of bringing back into �be Reich ehe prcr�incea of 
Eupen and Melmady.8 Foreign Miniater Hymana dec lared that the 
Belgium Government had no intention of agreeing to any di•-
cuaa ion on Belg!.an frontiers or territory. '!'he Belgium Govern-
ment was well aware of the German •ttitude in regard• to Eupen 
and Melmady and was prepared to deal with any attempt to return 
them to the Reich. '11\e Reichstag vote only served as another 
warning of what was to come. The matter came up again on 
October 4,  1932 ,when th� !elg!.u:n Government sent a note to the 
Reich Govermnent proteeting againet German demons trations at 
Krefelt agai1U1t Belgian control of the Melma1y region.9 Germany 
claimed that the referendum to determine Melmady' s  future after 
the world war had been unfai r .  :3elgium, in turn, denied the 
German allegation and reiterated that the vote had been approved 
by the League of Nation• and that the queetion could not be re-
opened. 
In the latter part of 1930 Belgian foreign policy came 
under attack in the Chamber of Deputie e .  Led by Emile Vandervelde . 
aociali•t leader and former Minieter of Foreign Affair•, a cam-
paign waa begun for the revision of the Franco-Belgo pact of 
8NT!' ,  March 2 5 ,  1931,  p .  1 1 .  -
9!!!£.. October 6 ,  1932 , p. 8 .  
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1920 . lO Ever aince 1ta a i&Diag. many Be lgians feared it 
would make BelglUUl a vaaaal of lrench �ollcy. 1a�J�rvelde 
felt that the Locaroo agreement• made tbe pa(:t winec .. aary and 
that the pact waa OQt ia the ioter .. t of intemation.al diaarmament 
which hia party •up�orted. 
Pr3nce waa naturally ala� at the deve lopment io Bel• 
3ium, bu� aero•• tho channe l ,  Jrituh opinion reacted favor-
ably aina• tbey believed an iodepeadeot Be lgium. wae l••• likely 
to be dragged into a cooflict �•tw .. n Franca aocl Germany . Tor 
the rrench , thi� vaa the fir·1t time that oue of th• intregal 
pa1·ta of it• alliance system waa beginning to lootc tow•rda a 
more lndependeat foreign pol�cy. 
The J'oreign Af faira Comadaaioo of tbtt Corunbe'.t• of �)eputie• 
io January of 1931 reported that Belgium ' •  foreign policy �•• 
explic itly deetned in the Cov.nant of th.a League of Nation� . 
th• Locamo 'I'reati•• • the Kellogg Pao t a'id other intern.utional 
arrangement• concluded •inc• the war. Tlwt report continued , 
"Thea• tTeatie• aaau�e B�laium her traditional �ighta under 
guarantoe of Britain and rraace, with an additional tJU&rantee 
by Italy. " 11 The Comniaaica concluded that the Vranco ... Belgo 
lOl!!It t>ecember 29, 1930, p .  l .  
lt NYT, January 10, 193 1 ,  p .  17 . 
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pact did not in any way jeo-pordiae Belgian international policy 
and aupported ita continuance .  
After the failure o f  negotiatioft.8 between Belsium and 
the .. tberlanda over their territorial diapute in 1926 and 
1921, eemi-official delegatiou of the two eountriea continued 
to meet in secret. BoweveT, the Dutch parliament got wind ef 
the proc .. diaga and called Porelgn Miniater !eel .. rts van 
Blokland to ieaue. Thia reeulted in all negotiation• concerning 
the treaty being broken off in April of 1932. Otherwi••• lalg1an .. 
Dutah relation• improved in th• early part of the 19'0 ' • ·  
Belgium began to fear that the Locartto Treatiee atght 
not give it all the aecurity •he desired; and with the League 
of Nation• exbibittns veakn••• in regard• to the Par laet aitua-
tion, the Belgian• began to lean more tovarda Prance. The riee 
of Hitler and the internal weakae•• of rrance during th••• year• 
did not give Belgium nueh ueurance . In 1933 tcherchove , the 
Belgian Miniater to Germany, informed the United State• Ambasaador 
to Berlin. William E .  Dodd, that Belg1Wl1 muet alway• rely on 
Britain ' •  aupport rather than that of Fraace. 12 
The change in the relation. of th• two Lowland atat•• 
12w1111am !. Dodd & Martha Dodd (ed . ) , Ambu•ador Dodd' •  
R!!n, 1933•'8 (lfn Yon i Harcourt , Brae• & Coat*l1. 1§41), 
�. 
68 
came first in commercial relat ions as witnessed by the O s lo 
Convention and the Convention of Ouchy. Whereas both were 
faced with an increasingly di fficult situation in Europe , the 
Netherlands also had to consider the grave crisis in the Far 
Eas t .  In the past she had relied on Great Britain to maintain 
the status quo in the East Indies , but the recent turn of events 
there indicated a radical change in Dutch policy. 
Under these conditions it was little wonder that the 
Netherlands s trongly supported the Disarmament Conference in 
193 2 .  At Geneva on February 1 5 ,  193 2 ,  Foreign Minister Van 
E lokland recalled the Hague ' s  failures of the past in regards 
to disarmament . 
Now the mere existence of the League of 
Nations , the Pennanent Court of Interna­
tional Just ic e ,  the pact of Paris and 
the Convention for Financ ial A s s 1.stance 
give us far greater guarantees of security 
than we had then . 13 
Fou-r ::nonths after H i t ler ' s  access ion to oower i.n �ennany, 
the Reich con�luded an economic agreement with �olland on �gy 
10 , 1533 . Rolland resented Germany ' s  quota restrictions of 
previous years , but the new agreement gave remar�able scope to 
the quota idea . It gave Holland duty conces s i on on agricul tural 
products and the Dutch could scaresly protest �ince they them­
se lves had made use of quotas in past economic pac t s . 14 
l3�TYT, February 16 ,  191? , P .  8 .  
14 11 8 7  Bonne , p .  • 
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'.4hen .:-&it: ler took office in January of 1933 Germany • ,.  
forei�n policy waa going through a trans it ional period. During 
the twenties , thia policy was dominated by attempts to 1ettle 
the reparationa problem; now it wa1 b•&inning to be concerned 
with Germany ' s  international pos ition . 
It ia really no eaay matter to conduct 
German foreign pol icy today. !ut it8 
goal ahould not be left in doub t ;  it 
i e  the reatoI�tion of Germany aa e Might State . 
:Jitbin the League of Nations Germany atrove to ac:compliah this 
obj ective, but waa blocked by the Treaty of Ver1aille1 . The 
tr•aty had called for the disarmament of Germany ,  and rea li•ing 
that they could never rearm �hile aurrounded by the French ayatem 
of alliances , the Weimar ltepublic attacked the Veraaillea Treaty 
through the i11ue of diaarmament. On September 12 , 193 1 ,  Julius 
Curt is , German �inister of ror•i&D Affairs , addr••••d the League 
Aaeembly . 
The counterpart of the obli1ation1 
assumed by 11ermany in 1919 i s  a formal 
undertakina on the part of th• other 
�tates that disarmament by t;ermany 
should be •imply a prelude to general 
disarrriam.nt by th• other Pow•ra . �l""l\an 
disarmament w .. to be the firat s tep in 
a eeheme of general d ia•rmament .  Twelve 
years have elapaed 1ince then, and Germany 
15 General von Seeckt ,  I!!!. Future !!£. !h!_ German Empire 
(New York: I .  P .  Dotton & Company, Inc . , 1 93n) , p .  153. 
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has been & Member of the LEta�ue for 
five years , without that und•rtak ing 
having been fulfilled . 16 
Kn�ing that tbe other European states would never agree on a 
general disarmament, the essence of the Germa.n 1 trategy was to 
gain support for the rearmament of the aei ch .  
Nazi foreign policy reauaed threads of German Weltpgli.tik 
under �i lhelm II , but magnified it greatly. It waa marked by 
a dynamic expansionism Yhich wa• rationalized by the need for 
'' living space • " In Me1.n Kempf, Hit ler had written that the 
National Socialist Party: 
. . .  must take up the atru�gle against 
the aimle11 and incompetence which 
have hitherto guided our German nati.on 
in the line of foreign affair• . Then , 
t>1ithout conaideratton of ' tr ad it ion• 
Rnd prejudices , it must find the courage 
to gather our people and their strength 
for an advance along the road that �ill 
lead thie people from ita present re• 
stricted living apace to new land and 
aoi l .  and henoe alao free it from th• 
danger of '1aniahing from the earth or 
of aerving others aa a alave nation . 17 
For a tbouaand 1••r• the Germana h•d been driving to 
the Eaa t ,  •ometimea peacefully and acmetinae• behind a bloody 
161,eague of Nations Official Journal. S?ecial Supplement 
#9 3 ,  p. 88 . citod in James · � .  Gantenbein (ed.) .'.Jocwuentary 
Background of World War II � 1931 to 1941 (Rev Yorkt Columbf a 
University Pi'eaa , l9�,-P. 613. --
17Adolf Hi tler , Mein K)mef . tran• . Ralph Manheim (Bo•ton: 
Houghton �ifflin Company. lq62 , p. 645t646 . 
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eword. 81tle� wrot•i 
The future aim of aerman foreign policy 
ahall be Oatpo l i t ik (an .Ea1tern J>Olicy) 
aiming at the acquisition of oeceaaary 
soil for our German nation . and not an 
�a1tern or W••tern orientation . 18 
Thia waa the old Orang nach Osten policy of �aiaer Wilhelm I I .  
Hitler w•• c lear i n  hi• 1tatement of future policy. 
w� atop th• eodl.ea1 movement to the 
south anJ �•a t ,  and turn our �3ze to­
ward the land 1o the ••a t .  At long 
la.st we break off the colonial an.d 
commerc ial policy of the pre-war 
pariod an<l shift to the soi l policy 
of tbe future . 19 
'11le main objective of Na'i foreign policy wee tae 
creation of a great Ge.rman Re ich which would briog within its 
fold all the provinc•• of the �ru1ao•German empire loat at 
Ver•ail l•• · But fir•t the Treaty of Ver1ailles bad to be 
torn to shreds and th• rearmament of Germany coaplet.ed . Hi t ler ' s  
Reich could have no mean1.ng unl••• Austria was included , nor 
could the achievement o! the greater German program be begun 
without the ene i r� lement or d«struetion of C �•choslovekia . 
P.eaidett Austrit\ sod the German populat ion of c .�ecboalovak i a ,  
the �reater Germany wae to inc lude the German �opulac e of 
10!oltan M .  s �a z ,  �rm.any' 1 Ea1tern Fronti er ' s  (Chicago: 
ni:inry XF �nery Company t 196-1) • p .  73. 
19Hi tler , p .  654. 
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Accordtn� t o  9i t ler tber• were te111 . i f  any. ttate• 
in Euro�� that had not enriched itself terr1 torially st 
Germany' a or her allies ' expenae- . Under thette eondf �·f ons 
th• R•lcb could expect aoma d :t fff.eulty in findin.� any worth-
while ally on the eontinen t .  l�u• i t  was necesaary foT the 
Nazi party to direct the energi•• of the German people towards 
the 1trengthin� of the state. 11\e German mi li tary mAchlne 
had to be rebut.lt . 
No State . . •  vould want to ally it1elf with 
preeent-aay Germeny. which can give no 
military hel�; hence the immedi ate object 
\Jf German foreig11 policy muat be trana­
foruaation of th•· nation into a 1trongly 
arwc!d mi lit.ary sta�e . vppresaed ?•op le.a 
• . .  are never freed and unifiEd i n  a common 
fa·�pi 'te b r  M:.tn! of f laming pTotests , but 
through a aharp , uneheathed •word . The 
foi:-gln� of thJa t\.'Ord and the iecuring 
of mili tary allies i.• the ta1k1yt the leader• of ita foreign policy. 
7Jur1r.g h i 'i  fi.rilt fe� lt'onth� of c f fice 1 \�:i t l•r thran�, 
from. rdUltilateral obligations . from trtaties and pacts in 
which he would have had to deal \.'.'ith � nuuaber of pllrtt'er1 at 
th-e same ti�• . l:te avoided all .agr••ir,entt that we:�e backed by 
the guarantees of several differerit powers . Re prefe-rTttd to 
?D ' frnea t  Hambloch , .G�r!!!ao_y ll8D"t9an t :  S tu�y !.!! l'!onomic 
Mi.li.tari•m (Rev Yol"k t Carrick & !vane , Inc . , 19 9) J.' .  195 . 
2 1Mi ldred S .  Wei theimer . :;emn� Under Hi tler (Ne� York: 
foreign Policy Associ.at:ion , 1935) , p .  4t.. . 
negotiate td�::.� only one partner at: a tifl',f! . n:.s aim was 
bilateral tr�nt j e s .  th• f1llfillt:'lent of which he would have 
to 11r�ue abO'.•t •d th only ona lon� contra� t1.nf'- 1:1.Srty. (�e had 
no intent ion of ,,ork ing to-t'1ardtt a harmonous "european comnnmity . 
•'ln the c or, t:rary , h� sought to separate every nation individually , 
one after the other , from thf.g community. Hitler ' s  whole oh11o-
1o�hy towards foreign policy wa• aummed up in a etngle aentence--
0State bound1r1 es are made by m.an and changed by man • ,:Z2 
The National �oc 1 3 l ist conception recognized no interests 
beyond those of the individual •tate ; tt acknowledge d no soli-
darity which 1.f'i}Jht have demanded their eacri f:l.ce to thoae of 
th• i nternational community. Hitler waa prepared to violate 
any agra ... nt or international principle if it beca111e abaolutely 
necea1ary for the catTying out of hie party • •  aims . 
P�rti1an , religioue , humanitarian , and 
all other criteria in �!nera l ,  are 
completely irrelevant . 
22uitler, p. 653. 
23 Ibid . ,  p .  609. 
CHAPTER. lV 
PROLOGUE TO WAR 
Oo April l ,  1933 , tba creation of the APA (Aua•eopoli-
ti•cbea Amet der ISDAP) waa announced to tbe Germ.an preas . 
The APA was an adv1aory body aet up at the euggeation of Alfred 
Rosenberg, the Masi party ' •  philoaopber. Its purpo•e . according 
to Rosenburg , was " to make the German people aware that foreiin 
policy is not a matter for a small caste , but the concern of 
the entir• riation."1 It• more immediate taaka consisted of 
entertaining foreign visitors , observing foreign developments , 
and maintaining aurveillance of various peraonalitiea . The 
lack of funda cauaed its eventual demiae , but it was only the 
beginning of a complete ayatem of organi utions to be cr•ated 
for the purpoae of maintaining strict governmental control 
over the Reich and an awareneaa of activities in other nationso 
Beaidea having a part in the crea tion of the APA . 
A lfred Rosenburg •l•o developed what became known aa the "Rosen-
burg plan . "  According to this conception , the new Nazi acate 
1volk leo, April 4, 1933 cited in Paul Seabury , The 
Wilbelm••traaa�Berkeleyi Univer.ity of California Pre....-:­
l9S4) ,  p .  34 . 
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existed only as a provisional or transitional stage to another 
higher conception : the Germanic Union, the combination of all 
Germanic peoples. The plan demanded: 
. • •  the disintegration of Belgium, the 
Germanic , Flemish part of which, to­
gether with Brabant and Luxembourg , 
is,  as in the case of Switzerland , t.o 
be separated from the French Walloon 
part . It makes Flanders and Holland, 
the old German Burgundy, the North­
Western part of the racial empire . 2 
In Belgium, W .  Hermans and a Van Severen transformed 
the old FlE·misn movement into a purely Nazi organizaticn called 
the Flemish Nat ional B o lidarist s (Die t sche Nationale Solidaris-
1 ten) • - Ref erred to a s  ' 'DinasosH ; they wore Sv:ast:Bas, sang � a z i  
tJongs � decried Jewery , demanded the abolition o f  parliament: ,  
wore s t andardized uni.forms , and maintained their own mi ltrary 
organization. Another organi�ation forme d by a Dr. Br,rms and 
called the · �council of Flanders" strove for a F' lemisb upr·l s ing 
aga ins t thE: Ee lgi.an Government. Its s logan was , .,Back to 
Gennany , back to the Germanic race ! Hitler aa a new Emperor 
J� Charlemagne . 11 •. 
For the most part , Nazi ac tivi t y  i.n Ee:lgium was of little 
notice prior to 1935 whtm the Rexi.st party emerged to national 
2Ernst Henri, Hit ler Over �urope (Ne� York : S imon & 
Schus ter , 1934) , p. 129· 130. 
31bid . , p .  148 . 
4 Ibid . , p • 150 . 
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attention . In AuguAt of 1933 a conference �•• called in Veiviers , 
n•ar the bord•r becnus e of obj ect ions that German touris t s  �ften 
aaag German Hymns when passing through Rupen and Ma lmedy . 5  For 
the t ime being. th• Belgi&n Goveroment on l y  saw to i. t tha t po­
lice 1urvei l lance waa incr•aaed .  
On the international 1cene the Y••r 1933 '11,iaa rather 
uneventful aa regards Belgiun' a j nce her basic conc ern was the 
i111proveroent of her financial cond ition. However , there was 
still great concern over her foreign policy . Albert Deve se , 
Belgian Miai•ter of War, on Oc tober 11 requeeted an increase 
in military expenditures . The requeat ca-me •• a reeult o f  the 
Belgian people ' • reaction to Hitl•r ' e  policies . The Mini s ter 
of �ar felt that in s pite of Belgium ' • financial difficultiea , 
•h• could no longer postpone work on her defensive aystem. l n  
llecember, the BelgiUDl Senate responded b y  voting (80 t o  59} 
759 mil lion franca (about $158 , 390 , 000) in extra-ordinary cre­
dits for fortificat ions along her eas tern borders . 6 
Bel�ium waa grave ly concerned about the evident weaknesB 
of her ally France and vas becoming generally disi. llusioned 
about the poasibility of maintaining peaoe in Europe . 'nte 
5!!!!, Auguat 2 7 ,  1913 , � .  l � .  
�NYT, �cgmber 1 3 ,  19 33. p .  18 . 
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telgian Count �ndre de Kherchove diecuseed the matter i n  ?er-
l i n  �1th �mbets !dor �odd of the United S t ate• i n  lsouary �f 
1931..& . 
He emphasi zed the dangers to h i t  country, 
its close re l i Qnce upon England aod the 
atroc iti e s  of the Gftt:man occupat ion. M& 
�gr•ed there i s  a lot ot tAlk about a 
'1 preven tlve ·wa.r0 in French offi c i a l  
c f  rc,e1 .. feiu·ing thi s would m�an general 
war. 
Under the c: loa\ of m.aking f'.;ermany self-sufficien t ,  
Hitler began carryin� out an int•rnational economic policy 
des igned to build up a huge German trading deficit. In this 
way. the Reich received essential gooda and at the same t ime 
made her credi tors dependent upon her in aome re1pec t1 . Bolland 
was one of the flret 1tataa to rea iat thia poli.cy and began ex-
ercia ing •triot oontrol1 over her import• to Germany: 
. . .  •o aa to keep them from running out 
of hand and creating debts that every 
Dutchman knew the Germane wl'21d never 
be able or '"11 ltna to me• t .  ·· 
!o counteract the decline in trade wi tb 1ermany , Rol l.s.nJ t•J rned 
more to Great Bri tain . 
�a�i activity i n  1933 wa� a much greater probl4ttt. to the 
Netherlands than to f· e lgi.um . In th� ".ttch province of 'Limburg , 
7 Dodd , p .  74 . 
8
Adriaan !arnouw. 
Short H i atory (New York : 
p .  201 . 
The Mak. ing of Mod•rn Ho 1 land : A - -
'/.' w .  w .  Norton Company , Inc . ,  194 . . • ) , 
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the �a� i s  found ferti l• ground for recrui ts among �he ��ny 
German mine work ere :!.n that ar••. Hear the �:termari•Dutch 
fron tier at tfer�ogenrath, the Ni u .l  leader Van Waterland asaerted 
tluat five hundred German atorm troop• t."ere ready to aid the 
Dutch Nazis i.n taking Lim.burg. 9 On July 13 the Dutch Justice 
Ministry took action and ordered that all fore ign propagand i s ts 
be expelled from Rolland . 
A large majority of the Dutch 11.vlng i.n the Limbur� 
province viewed the situation un favor•bly and on August 1�6 
when the Nat ional Socialist Netherland• Labor Party held mee t i n�s 
there , many of the �erman Na�i• who had at tended had to have 
f>O l ic� escorts on their return to the border. 10 The di1ord•r• 
cau•ed by the Nazi activity finally forced authori tiea to for-
bid th• wearing of brown shirt• or Na�i emblems by t.ho1e cros• 
1 ng the Dutch• 1erman border into Holland . Concern became ao 
great that on December 29, 1933 , th• Ju�ch Gov•Tnment 11�ued 
a decree forbidding state employ••• from being affiliated with 
the National Socialiet movement in Holland. l l  
The Netberlande Goverament wiebed. aa far •• possible ,  
to maintain good relations vith tbe Reich . W'beo the mun14 1paltty 
9.!!!I.• July 11, 193 1 ,  p .  1 1 .  
lO!!!!• Auguflt 17 , 193 3 ,  p .  11 . 
llln:!:, December 30 , 193 3 ,  p .  5 .  
19 
of Vanda111 pT->e la1.med a boycott on �""!rn:�;,.1 goo•Js at th�' end of 
l Q 1 3 ,  t.he G�vermnent dect·eed that thit action ·t1u1 illegal s 1 nce 
... ") Gormany was a friendly natio:t • .&. t.. The Government aleo requested 
the curbing of posters attsckin:� Hi.tler since they were not 
calculated to aasu�e better l)utch•Gel"m•n r•lationt . 
There existed tn ·}{ollaad several Na ttonal Socialist 
organizations . The largest was led by Anton voa Musaert.  The 
Mational Socialist Metherlands Worker ' •  Party -was directe.d by 
Major von Kruyt and the party ' •  ?ro�ram left no doubt as to its 
or.i.entation. 13 Periodi.cals and newspapers were alao a potent 
Naiii weapon. There waa The Netherland• National Socialta t  -
which usually dealth with racial tbeoriee , the Nacbrichlenblatt 
de N'f.ederl.aode which handled official communique• of the 'NSDAP -
and propaganda material,  the Deutache Wochenteitung fuer die 
Niederlande , and !2!. German � � Netherlanj1 , !�lgiu:.!Q. and 
Luxembourg. By the eunmer of 1934 , due to Na�:t. policies in 
Germany, the .Dutch movement experienced a decline in membership 
from Jo t ooo to about is.ouo. 
Irregardleae of the National Socialist movement 'in 
Holland, the Jutch and German Governments cont1nut>d to foster 
12Ibid. 
1lworld Coamd.ttee for the Victuma of German Fascism, 
!!!.!. Brown �etwork : !!!!_ Activities 2!, Na�i• .!.!!. �or�i n Countries 
(New Yor� : Kni_ght Publi.oation t Inc . ,  1Q36) . p .  lM)·V� l .  See 
Appendix l V .  
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favorable relations . On September 22,  1934 , a tr•de agreement 
on tranefer payment• waa eucceasfully concluded . According to 
the pact , trade payment• between Germany and Holland were to be 
made in the future excluaively through clearing aecounta . 14 
It alao provided protection of Dutch tranait trade . However, 
in consequence of difficultiea vhicb the agreement caused to 
Dutch export trade , the Netherlands Government notified the 
Reich Government on November 3 ,  1934, that the accord �ould be 
terminated in two week• . 
Belgium was in the center of a circle bounded by Great 
Brita 1.n, France and Germany •  and expoaed to the danger• inher• 
ent to her �eographical situation. Ita iron and steel made i t  
one of the mo1t important manufacturing centers in Europe . 
Theae factors , along wt.th the development of a martial apiri t 
i n  �rmany, oaueed the Belgians much concern over their future 
and were alway• cons idered in evolving their foreign policy . 
No state feared the rearmament of Germany more . 15 
The nationality question was alway• a problem in Bel�ian 
foreign policy.  Approximatt!ly one half of the population was 
Flemiah who were inclined toward• peace and hoetile toward• 
l ' '1!!!, September 23 , 1934 , p. 17 .  
l5!!I,, February 2 5 ,  1934 , Sect .  VIII p .  3 .  
R l  
any policy which might drag Belgium i o t o  the French orb it - The 
Walloons • on the other band , looked towards an eventual cua tOt'{tS 
union with France and aleo advocated a c�oo organi�•t1on o f  
defense on the ea•tern frontier. Not only did this internal 
divis ion h i nder the dev�lopaent of foreign policy, 1t alAo �ave 
the fasc i s t s  grounds of discontent with which to attack � e l gium ' a 
i nternal s tab ility. When Albert 1 was killed i n  a moun tain 
c li.mbin� acc l.dent in 1934 and was succeeded by Leo?old '.! I T . 
many Eelgians were already thinking in term• of revising their 
forej gn pol i c y .  
In London during April o f  1934 , military p lanners were 
concerned over the pos s ib i lity o f  !>utch air a pace being used 
in a future German air a ttack on England . The G�rman- Ott ch 
frontier waa i.ncluded in the Locamo Treaties and this gap 
caused some concern . Great Britain 1ug_get1ted the cre.atton of 
a neutral air zone over the Netherlands and Belgium. Eclgi.um 
�•• inc luded due to its geographical l0t: ati on . Both of the 
small states re.1 ected the plan--BElgium because of h .. r m�mories 
of pre-war neutrality and Holland becaus� the plan i mparted 
the i dea of a reetri cted aovere i gn i t y .  Belgium, for her ?Drt , 
s t i l l  considered neutrality unfeasible, but at the same t ime 
•he wa1 becoming increaa ingly a�are of the fact that France 
could no longer maintain herself ae the "protector" of Ver s a i l les . 
8 2  
"the 7rench att i t\1.de towards d1sar1n.ament also addt�d to the 
grw·tng split in tht1 Franco-Belgo bond . An indication of the 
changing Belgian vi.ew came on May 1 2 ,  1931, .  when Count ?oullet ,  
a member of the Belgian cabinet 1aid: 
Neutrality for Belgium • • •  !• a necessary , 
firt t ,  from the viewpoint of national 
coheeion , and , second, from the viewpoint 
of the f.ndependence that small States 
muat prea•rvt i f  they are to fulf i l l  the ir 
normal role. 6 
Nationa l i s t  organizat i ons began springing up 1 �  Belgium 
r:turing \rri l of 193l• . ln fact , in a peri.od of three cionths . 
such 1groups developed in twenty five district s .  One orss.ntza-
t i on o:,;bich called itself the 0Blue Shi.rtslf pledged :i, t s�lf to 
rid Belgium of all polit ical part i es and the regime . 17 Ljke 
its earlier �erman C O\mter-part (the "Broun �bi rtsu) . it wAa 
constantly engaged in street fights with soc ial ists , and was 
organized along mi litary lines . � b i l l  banning the wearing of 
uniform. except those of government services wa� introduced to 
parliament on May 15,  1934 . In the galleriea , the "Blu• Shirt•'· 
rioted causing the 1e11 ion to be sus pended until the nati �nal· 
i 1 t s  were c leared out . 18 
The Rexi 1 t ,  a nat iona liat group of little recogn i t 1 or. 
16!!!!, Hay 13 ,  1934 , Sec t .  lV, p .  2 .  
171!!!• April 1.0 , 1934 , p .  1 4 .  
18!:!!!, May 1 6 ,  1934 ,  p .  lD . 
f.H'.JSO 171f "cleanaing1• the C.ttholic party frOlr! t>Jithin. I t  adoptEd 
the name achristue 'Rex'· (Christ the � i ng) , but dropped "Christ:ua" 
in 193 5 .  'i11e Rexiet party ' s ineignia consisted o f  a croaa and 
a crCNn, and the Pays Reel was the party ne,,1apaper. Al: i ta 
creation, the aexi1 t purty did not openly repudiate de�.ocracy, 
only economic liberalism. I t  did not have a unifottiea mi lltia , 
nor did it specifically advocate dictatorah!p though tbi� vaa 
i t a  end . ku1aolini subsidized the llexiat and later put a radio 
s tati on in Mi lan at their di1posa1 . 19 
The founder of the ltftxi 1ta was Leon Oegrelle vho drew 
moat of hia support from the Walloon sec tions of the countr y .  
On Hitle� ' •  order• , Degrelle ne6otiated a deal with M .  Dec lerc n �  
che Flemish pieudo-dictator. 20 Although the nati ona liat groups 
in Belgiurr. were of small � i �e , they along \'11th th• extrem l s t  
r!Ovewent• on the left made i t  difficult to maintai.n cabine-t:s i n  
the latter 1930 ' • ·  '!'he rise of fascism i.n celgium waa du• to 
three e lements : (1) middle-claas diaccr.tent on both econo�tc 
and political grounda ;  (2) almost universal recognition uf oeed 
of reforming machinery of the state , and (3) the apparerat decadence 
19c. E . !lack and '!! . C .  Helmreieh, 1\, ·entieth c�ntu!Y 
Europe . ! Hiatory (New York : Alfred A .  Knopf, 1966) . p .  31� .  
20ca.m1 ll• Huysman• , About Be lgium ( London � Sutchin•on 
& Company , 19�4) , p .  3 9 .  
o f  t?'c?S1Ji tio�:a 1. l'artil!s . 
!n .... . a.m.�.1ry <)f t 91� morf' incid«nt� brr->k� out 1 n Ruper'\ 
�uld y,�alraedy 'lvf' tc· th• rftgu1t9 of. the $a1tr ?lttbi.c:s f t e .  N-'.l�i 
gntagonists callP.d for the two provf.nce1 to fol low the s�ar ' 9 
�xarnple , and they c1trrie<t sm41 l ��nnan flag� 1. n�eribed > "Tot:'lOrrow 
1 t wi 11 be the turn of r.upen an:1 Ma lme 1y to ret•.irn to the f.a.tber­
land .  "21 F:;..nally troops had to be 3Cmt in to quell the d i s turb• 
ancee and return the situation to normalacy .  Belgi um reali�ed 
�hat her poa ition wad uCN more percarious than ever. Vil August 
1 in a radio speech from Pari1 , the Belgian Minister of War 
warned, "'l'hia country . . •  should have a s trong army and the 
m•ana fo,· combat and vrotect ion which are indispen•able to 
p1·eserv.: u� Crom aggres s lon . n21 This apeech reflected the 
changing attit:ude that 'Belgium abould be prepared t.o act inde­
pendently i.f nec:�eeary. 
Financ ially. nelgium wa• forced to devalue i t s  currency 
28 per cent. Luxembourg. becau1e of her commerc i a l  union with 
Belgium. also devalued its currency bt�t only l•') l�r cent .  The 
Grand- i>uchy felt that Be laium had violated the spir i t  of the 
union by workb1g for preferred treatment of. its �-n J rot1 and 
21!£Cr.. Janu�ry 17 , 1935 ,  p .  1 5 .  
22.!!!, August 5 ,  193 5 ,  p .  5 .  
�t��l eTport t .  '"'� R i tuation threaten�d to epl i t  up th� 
A?rf.1 f. ,  1 � 3 � ,  awid f ts pt�rpo1e wa1 to avof.d diaturban�•• in 
the commeret al �xehangea of all thr•e . I t  wa* to las� s i x  
�ntht end call�d for ��a1ure« t o  prevent Franc� fretr. bei ng 
for efforts to �.aintain !elgian and Ltnte\1\bourg export prices 
enual to those prior to devaluation . 23 
A step tow�rds 1.mprovement of German•!el�ium 'relati ons 
wa• taken on August 5 ,  1 9 3 5 ,  with th• conclution of a trade 
ftgl!'eement whi.ch called for rigid c leari.ng condi tiontt between 
tbe two state s .  ?bis waa followed u p  on October 1. 1  with an 
of.fer by lH tler of a non-aggression paet. Jn talk.1 between 
Joachin R i bbentrop and rremler Ven ieelAnd, the �erman diplomat 
.augge11ted that Germany might drop 1 ta clni.m to !upen and fl'!sl roedy 
ghould fel g t um  accept a non-aggre-std on pact . Ri bbent-rnp r�-
1t1sured Vttn ·�e•land by stating: 
�ermany ba1 no enmi tiea in the Weet . . .  
but she .muat prepare to defend herealf 
in the Katt agai.n1t the siniater plans 
of Moscow. which is preparin?, for an 
23MYT, April 7 ,  193� ,  p .  36. 
fl • 
·.· t' 
1 nv;aa i.f\n of CentTa l �.urope by n 
coloaeal air force , 24 
However, the propoaal aever developed into substantial nego-
tiationa and relations were dampened on October 21  when a 
Liege court took Belgian cltiaen1hip away froa four leaders 
of the Home Loyalty movement in Eupen and Malmedy on the grounds 
of their efforts to return the two province• to Germ.any. The 
G�rman reaction wae one of anger. Ansriff,  a Na�i newspaper, 
declared , ''Every effort at revision , however peaceful,  t s  
punished by losa of citizenship .  ••25 The Deutsche Allgemeine 
Ze-ituns 1tated that the verdict• must create "aatonlahment and 
ind1gn•t1.on . 026 On November 3 a formal proteat wa• •ent by 
the lteich to the Belgian Government. It  ia inter«ating to note 
that this was one of the first instances of an official Geri:uan 
pl"oteat in behalf of Germans l:l.vin.g in another country. 
Conscription, vhich was re•introduced by the Rei.ch io 
193 5 .  made an unfavorable impre•eion in both Belgium and the 
N�therland• . A• a defender of Versailles and .. an occupant 
of former German terri.tory. Belgium' •  poaition could easily bo 
understood . The Netherland• , •• a neutral atate, foresaw no 
immediate danger of war but feared that the a�rman step might 
2 t�NYT 
.:;.:.::,..J October 12 , 1935 , p • 1() . 
25Nn' 
-· Oc tober 25 , 193 5 ,  p . 15. 
26Ibid . 
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r.nusr;; �. nter.;attonn 1 comp licatinns . On the domes ti'.: ftC�nt!?' � tht1t 
�i.tther!ands: held it!I provincial elections i n  .\pril of 1�3 '5 ,  and 
'''Jt Q f 1 )  3 ?() , 000 vot<P.s cas t ,  the Nlltiona l Socia 11-r" t 'f ,  prc!sent: i r.< f:!  
c.u.udid.'ite� for the firac time , received 264 , ()00 vote:& or spprox• 
1.mately 8 ?Er cent of the total. 27 The thirty r :! ne �rovinc!al 
sea.ta award�td to the Nn:t!one.l Social.ista TA·ere 1mportsnt in 
that the provinc ial councils e l ected members to the u�per house . 
tlnde!'· the leadership of the National Soc1.al1 s t  party , 
�ermany made great stri.des towards the rebui lding of i t.s economy 
in the mtd•th1rtie� . In the fall of 1934 Hi tler initiated the 
German "New 7)eal . "  The objects of this �tan were to ad just the 
amount of forei.gn exchange ,J.sed for import pcrfK�•ett 1 to pre• 
vent. any inereAse in llerman indebtedn•�• to foreignors ,  and to 
base tr&de intercouree to various nati ons upon a more satis­
factory fou.ndation . 28 
'ftie> German Government withdr� f�om the ')!�Hlt'm&l.f11P.�t {"on-
f,f'reoce an-1 th<e �a1u� of !:olatione i.n <.l<: tober of 1933 �hen. Hi tler 
realized that neither of the'!t- bodt.ea "-�uld die.arm th• other 
nations nor ;;rant 'lE>rmany the right to rea'rm . 
lnagmuch as in these circ�matances th• 
27!!!, A�ril 19, 193 5 ,  p .  10 . 
22,y, ., . "'' h ... t t l �- s k (Lo ... ... � u.ll8t' \:)<: acu !... .!.... • , '""'rmany �-,ea•· . 1 n�on: 
�utterworth, Ltd . , 1938) . p .  285 .  
Thornton 
a�al ity �"hiob was solemnly prorni •ed 
to the German people and R.eich in tbe 
.feclaratioo of -:'lecember , 1932 , fat.led 
of realiaatioa, th• new a.ieh ' a  QoveTn• 
�nt , •• guardian of the honour ,and 
right to live of the German people , was 
unahle to continue to take part in con­
fereneea of that aort or to continue 
me:nberahip in the League of Nations . 29 
!a March of 1�35 , he 1hifted �n industrial effort to mili-
tary production, *ttnounced tlta creation of an air for1:..<E , and 
reintroduced compulaory m111tat"y service � Th• G•�n m1val 
fleet was also given a top priority, but in OTder to retain 
friendly relation• with �at !ri�ato , the Jte1ch concluded a 
naval treaty with England on J\Jne 1 8 9  19�5 . I� regarda to 
Ft'anee , ooe tource of friction �148 removed with the return 
of the ��ar to the Reich as ehe reault of an internation3lly 
controlled ptebi•cite on Jfl!luary 1 3 ,  1935. The Poli sh problem 
wae alao alliev11t•d with the signing of a �rmAD··Polish non­
a.ggres•ion pact in January of 1934. 
tn the latter part of Fe-bruary , 1936 , !e lgium t,egan · 
conc•niing herself about her ft1ture policy once the demi litarized 
�one (the Rh:l.neland) had ceased to exist .  Belgium realieed lt 
,,,ou\d only be a matter. of time before this pY-ovi•i.on of the 
29 4 Gantenbein, p .  64 • 
Veraaille1 T?"ea.ty would alto l>a struck down by Hi tler. t\s 
ev�nta turned out • t iM �'•• 1b..,rte-r than the lelgi•n Qovern• 
rr.ant had ex�eted . On March l ,  1936 ,  0"'11l8n troop• .arched 
unill'poded to to the Rhineland. Wot only 4td ·lenaay' 1 action 
remove one more raatr1et1on of V•Y••ltlaa , f.t was •110 aonaidered 
by aome to be a violation of the lhc:arno Treaties Which Bitler 
bad promi•ed to uphold tn a a,e•eh on Kty 21, 1 9 3 , .  
The pre•ent t'.Jera&ft Oovei:onaent will 
acnptllous 11 obeene any voluptui. 11 
1 igned treaty even lf conoluded kfor• 
its entry lnco offtca aa4 power • • •  (w• 
•111) . • •  uphold aad fulfill all oblt• 
a•tioa• ari•lng out of the Looa1'1lo 
Trea.tlea , ao long aa the other partn•�• 
on �b•ir 1 1de en ready to 1taod by t.hat 
paot • • • •  
1.o re1pect.iq ti. demilltui•ed aOGe the 
Oenwan <JO'Nrnment CODatdua ita action as 
a coatr�tloa t.o the paolficat1on of 
lu�pe . 
Bitler later cbarS.Jed that the •etch''• reaaon for entering the 
!thineland was baeed on the -.oeat millta:ry pact atgned betwe•n 
F'r.anoe and R�•ia . 31 However. tbi• pact v•• ennounced before 
the May 2\ tpeeoh. 
ln a lleichatag speech on Marcti. 7 ,  1936. the German 
Chancellor made new pTOposale fer !uTopean •ecurity . 
Q.,) 
(1) Th4 tJerman :Jovei-nment declare 
themselves prepared to negoti•t• with 
P't.'ance and Belgi.um for th• e1tablf.ehment 
of a bi lateral demilitartae-d �ooe and to 
••sent to othtlr propo1 11la with 'regard to 
the extent and e ffects of auch a zone , 
under th• 1 tipulatlon of complete paritJ. 
(1.) In order to aaeure the inviol•bility 
and lntearity of the frontier• in the W•a t ,  
the German Govel"D9ent propo•e the conclu• 
sion of • non-aur•••ion pact between GEirrnany. 
France, end Belgi\ltl\ with duration which they 
are prepared to fix at 25 y•ara . 
(3) 'ftle German Government de1tre to invite 
Bn�land and Italy to eign th1• tnaty a• 
guarantor Pdwere . 
(�) The -German Govertaent are willing to 
iftClude the GoV9�nt of tu lletherlande 
in th11 treaty 1y1t:ena �hould the �rmeent 
of the Netherland• desire lt , and the other 
treaty partnere approve . . . •  
• • • we proclaim now more than ever befqre 
our wiah to further the c•u•e of tll\ltua 1. 
underatanding between the nation• of Europe 
and parttculaTty an under•tand§�g amcMtg our 
w••tern nationa and neighbor• . 
Belgium 1upported France ' •  poeition of Qet'man withdrawal 
by s tating that the Belgium Oovem.ot had not 11.gned any agree• 
ment with Russia, yet ahe felt that OU'manJ had a110 violated 
!elgian 'righ�• undeT the Loeawno •&Yeewtnte . 33 She alao re­
j ec ted tlw Cel:'WllaD offeT of a non•aggre•aion pact knowing tbat 
Great Britain would aupport her 1.n tiM of need . In the 
Netherland• , Germany ' •  action was con.sidered to have violated 
32AJolf Hitler, ipeecb Delivered tn tbe Reichataf March 
7 .  1936 (l\nlint M Mul er & Sohn lt .  G. ,19Jgf, p. 34-3 . 
-
33nT, March 12, 1936, p .  13 . See Appendi.x VI .  
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all eurrent conception• of internat ional law. Characterieti• 
cally. in refennce to C.rmaa1 ' •  off•r of a noa••&&r•••lou pac t .  
all of the leading liberal new1paper• , Rleuwe aotte�&a1cbe 
eo.ttant ,  1t•ad•l•bltd , Tel•U••f, and the R•t Volk d•elared the 
Dutch deatn to maintain atrict neutwality. 34 Ro.ver. Li.oberg­
S ti ruat ,  DQtch Miniater to B•rli& \ ,  hld AMriean Aeb••••dor 
Dodd in effeet: 
Ri• own 1overament i• very doubtful what 
to do 1n eaae France •uceeeda in applyi ng 
ea.nctiona to Genaay on account of the 
march i.nto tbe 'lld.ne and the Cerman denun• 
eiation of the Locarno tteaty. !be economic 
li,f• of the Netberlagda depend• very much on 
export• to Gemany . 35 
Shocked by the pacifia• of Prance in regard.a to the 
Germa.n re-occupation of the abiulaad, B•l&iWft immediately be­
gan to think tn tena of reor1eo.tat1ng her foretgo policy.  On 
March 22, 1916. Van �eeland @cla'ed 1 
Jelglua, 11� otheT eaall countrie1 , 
Bolland and Switaerland , mu•t remain, 
perfMtly neutral ,  but tn anied �­
trality. Her role muac
3
r 11.tced to 
an attitude of defenae. · 
As part of the chanaing Belgian policy, Che governtDent on July 
1 joined Denman, Finland . Norway, �1eden. the tteth.erlands, 
''--!!!.!.• March 11, 1936 . p.  16. 
35 Dodd, p. 320 . 
3 6-1!!!.• March 22 , 1,36. Sect. IV� p.  4 .  
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Spain 4nd Switzerland in a joint declarat ion to the League of 
Nation• . Du• to tbe existing international s i tuation and the 
League ' •  failure to sanction Italy ' •  aetion in Ethiopia, theae 
smaller European • t•tee tendered cancellation of their obliga· 
tiona under Article XVI of the Covenaat.37 On July 2 1  the 
new Belgian Miniater of Foreign Affairs , Paul Henry Spaak . 
announced that Belaium d•aind to pur•ue a "realiatic" foreign 
policy--one 0exctlusively and completely lelgian . "  Spaake ' ot.m 
party, the Parti Ouvrier Belje (Socialiat Party) , held i t s  
Congress in September and iaau.d a statement expres1 ing i ts 
view of the new foreign policy. 
Deliberati.ng about foreign policy, tbe 
Congrea a  deelu•• that it baa never been 
and that it will neve� be a question of 
Belgium returning to neutrality • • •  that 
it.a policy ia and must be exc lusive of 
ell military alliancea and within the 
framework of the League of Nations . a 
policy of complete independence without 
�liti�ll ,  military, or economic reatr1c -
tion._ � .  
However. by Auguat many Belgian• had already begun to tbint< i.n 
terma of returning to complete neutrality •• a re1ult of the 
communist dominated Popular Froat Gove'l"l!IHnt in Prance . 
37Ha.na J .  Morgenthau, "The Jleaurrection of Neutt'a lity 
i.n Europe•• . The Amet'ican Poll tical Scie.nee Review, XX.XIII 
(June , 1939) :-;. 1.73. See Appendix VII. 
38 
Contribution !. letude � !!. 9.U•!tion royale (Bruxe lles : 
S .  A .  Edtaco, 1§46) ,  p .  40 . eited in E .  l&ymon Arango , Le·opold ill. 
and the Be}tiaa lt.or•l Quest ion (Baltimo-ce: The John Hopkins Preas , 
tn't}.p. . 
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BelgiUtll officially renounced her mi li tary agreement 
with France on October 14 , 19l6 . In a speech, King Leopold 
III a tated that Be lgium mua t puraue a policy aimed: 
reaolutely at puttina us outaide the 
cooflicte of our oelghbora ;  it respond• 
to our nation.al ideal. It can be achieved 
wltb a re .. onable •ilitary and financial 
effort and it will win the 1upport of tbe 
Belgian• , who are all animated by an inten•• 
aad 1oatinctive deaire for peac e .  Let those 
who doubt the poa1ibility of nch a foreign 
policy consider the proud ·�� decided example 
of Rolla1ld and Switaerland . 
�o day1 later at a meeting of the Counc il of Ministers , 
Our geographie poaition coaa•ada ua to 
m.aintatn a military apparatus of 1uffi.cient 
aiae to diaauade any of our neighbor• from 
using our territory to attack another state . 
In carrying out tbi• ai1eion Be lgium co• 
operate• eminently in achieving peace in 
weatern Europe , and she create• for beraelf 
the r i ght to the respect and to the eventual 
aid of •!J state• which have an intereat in peace • • •  
The Belgian Chamber of Deputies app-roved the new policy of 
" independence" on Oc tober 29 by a vote of 126 to 4 2 ,  the 
negative vote• being cast by the faac iet• , the Plemish national­
ists , and the coaauniata . 4 1 
39vandenboach , ? ·  269 . 
s 
40contri,utiop !. letude � l! Que•tio n ro�ale (Bruxelles : 
A .  Kdimco, 19�6), p .  4,. cited in Arango , p .  4�. 
41Nn, October 30 ,  1936,  p .  4 .  
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In Germany , the Belgian change of policy received 
little notice. The Diplomatiacbe Xorreapondenz , an unofficial 
voice of tlMt 1overnmant, meekly approved . 
The general tens ion and diequiet in Europe , 
aad not le .. t of all the po9eibilities con­
tained ln the alliance with rrance , which , 
through further oblisatioaa of the ?4rtner . 
could not be controlled, brought the dec i·· 
aion i n  Belg.ium independently, and \.?1th 
iocre•••d individual 1treng� , to watch 
over the nation ' s  security. 
There can be no doubt that Hitler waa pleased with this new 
developaMtnt �  but to break out i n  j oyoue statement• W0\1ld have 
been undiplomatic on hi• part . He knew that the Western Powers 
vould not violate Dutch or �•lg1an neutra lity which therefore 
offe�ed perfect cover for the northern , more vulnerable p�rt 
of the Rhineland and the ltuhr. Th• �reocb ayatem of alliances 
va• breaking down . 
Tb• year 1936 aleo wttneaaed a change ln Dutch f oTeign 
policy. The German march iuto the llhineland and the evident 
failure of th• League were the ba.ic reasons for th• Ne th�r-
lands taking part in the dec laration of small powere on July 1 .  
Rolland was returning to her Hold" neutra l ity.  The new tEtlgian 
policy was received favorably in the Ntre tber land• by tbe govern­
ment and neu•papera of a l l  political tren<ls . 4 3  With her southern 
42!!!. October 1 6 .  1936 , � ·  3 �  
43!!!, October 2 1 ,  193 6 ,  p .  7 .  
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border n�f neutra l the Ne ther lands fe it ber aecurity was �iv�• 
increaaed. In regard• co Germany. tbe Miaiat•r of the Netb�r-
laada atated in September: 
�e are all sure that Oermaay i n �end• to 
annex our country in due time, •l•o 
Switzerland and the other countriea 
where people of tbe mediev.i Ofp•n 
race lived or left decendanta . �� 
�l'he que1t 1on of Hol land ' • avoiding another world war was 
answered by Dionya van Nymegen Scbonegevel. foner comnander 
of a I>uteh submarine diviaion. 
lloi land will oot be able to •Uy out. 
and aa in any event �ritain wi ll f i ght 
GeXttiany . the latter vill try to get 
bold of the harbor1 c loae to the Eng1itb 
Channe l .  
As Hol land lies in direct flying line 
between England aad Ge�nv , the ilutch 
defenses would hardly be •f!ong enough 
to rea iat a German at�ae� . J 
Re•mil·itari zation of the ilhi neland vaa not the only 
concern of the Belgian• in 1936 . Domeatioelly. the Jlexi s t  
party made a etrong abowing by capturing tventy•one Deputy 
aeat1 in the May election. 1.'he reaction in ••rlia w .. one of 
satio faction aince tti. reaulta indicated a riae of the R.exlat 
Party and Gel'Rt&n aolidarity in !upen and Malmady. Tb• Belgian 
r.51!!, October 3 ,  193 6 ,  p .  S .  
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nc'vspsper � t oile .B�lge st.atod: 
We cannot deny that the R�xiat.a won a 
great victory. Degnlle choae bis 
moment well, for all the discontent 
•CJcumu.lated for years cr,atalized 
.around him • • .  
The votes of many Re&ilt partisan• were 
expreaaiona of reaentment againat the 
V•n Zeeland policy. We are not surprised 
at the eucceaa of the tt�xiat:s i\"i Eupeu 
and Malmedy, vbere pro•G•T• naturally �elcoroe the little Hitler. �6 
!lt!g·relle' • success was followed up in the June 7 elections 
for 690 provit:t.: i a l  consular• who would in tu'nl elect forty-
four senators . The Rexists captured aeveoty-eigbt of the 
conaular se.acs . 
In o�tobttr oo�relle promia•d to march on irusaels and 
sweep out the :.Jan Zeeland governmen t .  
w� will be bringer• of pG•Ce to Europe. 
Our mi••ion ia to b&l:"mOlliae GErmany and 
Fr-.·mce. We are through with following 
F"rance . I love that count-ry, and it was 
only ar• accident that I �1 88 born in Bclgt.ump 
for my birthplace is two ailea from the 
French frontier. My parents 4re P'rench� 
ao is my wife . 
hut France under the People ' •  Front Govern­
ment makea my heart bleed. France ' s  preeeat 
government will not las t .  The country will 
be obliged to follow u. .  I t  requi 'ftt• only 
Belgiwn--Rexiat Be lgium--to c lose the circle 
46NYT, �M.ay 2 7 ,  1936 • p .  13 . 
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around ber. G�rmany, .3pain f I t aly, atld 
�oon lelgf.um--al 1 F4laciat ! 
The old role of Belgium ia finished. Under 
a Rex1at etate everything wi.11 be cbanged . 
The missiori of Rex 1• to abolish all these 
old al li.ances and t() brt�g he lgJ. um to a 
position of first impOYtanc• .  ��lgtum 
will b• & leader with s�itzerlan ct ,  ao l land , 
and Lux•mbourg in a great bloc of neutrals 
who wi ll brf,ng ,e·ace to Europe . �'  / 
·�1hen the R.<rtxi . .s t  deza.or1st.ration in .aruaaela turned ii':.to 
riot, Degrelle and aevel."al other ttexi .st leadel"• wet"e .ez·rested 
by the Government . �any pr01uinent fa1ci $tS lben tore up their 
me�b•r•hi? card• and deserted the movement. I t  waa also at 
th.1• time that rumors were c ircul&ted conceming a tti.p �de 
bepeing that be would g�t ·rid of unjust privtle&e• , but au1• 
pic ion of �id from Hitler moved theuJ out of the Re.xi.st camp. 
In a s peech on November 22,  1936 1 De.ai-e lle t:ri.ed to reassure 
the Be lgian.a by stating that the Rexiat para lleled th• p01'.crel:'• 
ful tasciat partie1 of Germany and l taly ' ' in wi•hing to see 
orde·r and social peace reign. liut there . . •  chc- resei."'ttblence 
ends . 
Also: 
Th� totalttarian State is repugnan� t� our temperaeent . 
47Nn', October 2 5 ,  1 9 3 6 .  p .  l l .  
4g_ __ -!!!• November 2 3 ,  1936 , p .  14 . 
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rennovation . . •  It is a question of 
saving the people by exhalting their 
vi�tue 1 .  Belgium can and mus t live , 
but parties have suffocated what was 
most grand and noble in the c ountry. 49 
Perhaps certain foreign governments 
observe with s ympathy Rex • s  growth 
while awaiting a triumph in the near 
future . This is very natura l ,  because 
we are c ontributing our share in the 
fight against communism. We do not 
receive5�ny other encouragement from abroad . 
However ,  Degrelle ' s  appeal was to no avail ·ahd his party de-
clined i n  strength thereafter. In a s peech on January 30 , 193 7 ,  
Hitler declare d :  
Germ.any has , and here I repeat this 
solemnly, given the assurance time 
and time again, that for instance, 
between her and France there cannot 
be any humanly conceivable points 
of controversy. The German Government 
has further given the assurance to 
Belgium and Holland that it is prepared 
to recognize and to guarantee the inviol­
ability and neutrality of these territories . 5 1  
Further, he officially denounced the Treaty of Vers ail les , 
especially the war-guilt clause . In effec t ,  Hitler was offering 
non-aggre ssion pacts to the Lowland states . 
49Ibid . 
SOibid . 
Slu . s .  vffice of U .  S .  Chief o f  Council for Prosecution 
of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy .!!!2, Agresaion , Vol .  I ,  
(Washington, O .  C . : U .  S .  Government Printing Offic e ,  1946) , 
p .  6 3 1 .  
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Belgium. having just re-eently renounced her military 
pa�•tvitb rrance and reorientated ber foreign policy, had 
grave doubt• in regard• to any new arrananaent. After Germany ' s  
renunciation of the Locarno p,aeta , any new treat:y would be of 
doubtful value . 52 The Netherlaada , on th• other hand , weTe 
cl•�r fn their attitude. Foreisn M1niater de Graeff declared 
on February 13 tb.tt hie covernment appreciated tb• of fer but 
could never conclude: 
a treaty with aaotb.er 1tate regarding 
the invi.ola.bi.1 1. ty of �etherland• terri­
tory a• thia laviolabllity i• for th• 
Metherlands an axiom which cannot suitably 
be tbe eubject of a� agreement coaoluded 
by the Netherlauda . 3 
To fiirther indicate her strictly neutral attitude , the f)utch 
Government in March officially dec lared that th� Articla of 
the Covenant of the L�ague of Nations providing for free pas•age 
through territory of member atates of troops en1aged agaj,n•t a 
power declared by the League to be an aggressor, was no longe r 
considered binding by Holland. 
Towards the end of March, Ktn.g Leopold of Belgium re-
turned from a trip to London vi.th assurance of Be lg1.um • 1 re lease 
51u. s .  Depa�tmeat of Stat• , l>ocuments � QermaD Fore1;sn 
Policy. 1918 - 1945, From !!!!, Archives !!!, lli_ German Min i stry, ed. 
by a.. J .  Sontag et . al . �erie• C ,  Vol. V .. No . 27 @aehington 1 o. c . :  
U S .  (;overQIMntPrinting Office , 1957) . p .  5�) . 
· 
SlHandelingen, l•�•t• 'I.a.mer 1936-,7, Aanhengsel , p .  2 1 .  
cited i.n Vandenbosch , ? . 276-277. 
100 
!Tom the Locamo treatiu. Belgium w•• expected . however , to 
maint•in defenaea adequate to her defenae and to warn Great 
iritain of Garman flight• over �elgium in the direction of 
Knglcid. Reluctantly. France aleo agreed and the ''Eruaaela 
Declaration" of April ,  1937, officially •1gnified Belglum'• 
nn policy of 11independence Great Britain and France did 
p�i.9• untlateraly to aid Belgium ebould ah• attempt to atop 
Belgi\JID took part in any aiilitary action againat the Reich. 
The •- month oa the twelfth, Cenaay and Belgiia diacuaaed a 
poea ible economic agrewat . 5.5 Ia the fall, by th• 0Declaration 
of October 13, 1937" . Gamany gave a c lear and unconditional 
guarantee to Belaiua. 56 
Tbe situation in 1937 vaa tense as the other European 
natioru1 awaited Germany ' s  .next rnov.e . On November 5 ,  Hitler 
aaid that in order to preaerve and enlarge the German racLi.l 
comnunity, it was oecea1ary to aecure increased living apace, 
whatever tba riak. The immediate objective• wer. Auatria and 
Cze choslovakia, and the ir eeicur. could be attained only by 
force. Thi• wa1 the Roe•bach Protoco1. 57 I t  laid the groundwork 
54stack and Belmreicb, p. 322. 
55!!,I, April 13 , 1937,  p. 6. 
56u. s . ,  Office of U . S .  Chief of Coun••l for Proaecuti on 
of Axix Criudnality, Raai eoe•etracy • • •  , Vol .  I .  p .  761·762. 
s .. Appendix VIII � 
57 00 Paa•aot , p .  2 • 
for Hitler ' s  pol i c y  of the nex� eighceeo months , and h i s  every 
effort was put forth lo securi�g its successful conc lus ion . 
By 1937 the National Socialist Movement in the Nether-
lands was vn the decline as membership dropped from 78 , 000 t:o 
somewhere around 30 , ;no .  SB J n  the May election Anton Mus sert , 
the party leader t won a -'":hatnbe·r seat but resigned i t  due to 
his conc lusi.on that the Netherlands was not yet ri;>e for the 
National Socialist movement . Tf'l.e failur·e of his movement was 
due to several reasons :  (1) Netherlanders were too ind i v· idual-
istic to succumb to dictatorial processes ; (2) many members 
lost confidence in the organizing ability of Mus sert ; { 3) 
some objected to his methods ;  and (L�) after 193 5 ,  Hitler• s 
brutality in dealing with political opponents and his perse-
cution of the Jews caused a react ion against German y .  Mussert 
did not , however, retire from the scene . On September 2 b ,  
he announced the formation of a new party, the Setherlands 
Nationalist Movement . 59 I ncluding many members of Mussert 1 s  
former party , this group s trove to convert the Netherlands to 
universa. l  fascism rather than national soc ial ism . 
The Rexists in Be lgium were also dealt a severe blow 
58�• February 1 8 ,  1 93 7 ,  p. 1 3 .  
59!f!!, September 2 7 ,  193 7 ,  p .  8 .  
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at the polls oo Apr1.l 11,  193 7 .  The Government received 
275, 840 votes or 75 . 89 per cent wh:f.le the nationalist organi-
zation of Degrelle tal lied only 69, 242 votes or 1 9 . 0 5  per 
6G cent . 
Although fascist8 in both Belgium and �he Netherlands 
were experiencing great d ifficulty in keeping their part ies 
al:l.ve , they were still s trong enough to continue a policy of 
agita tion .$lnd disruption in the Lowland states . Morally 
supported by Germany ,  they were useful tools in Hitler ' s  hands 
for the s preading of German propaganda . Another element of 
which Hltler made full use in these and other countries was 
the existence of German minority groups . Their role was 
explicitly stated by Herman Goering i n September , 193 7 .  
You, Germans , who live abroad , have the 
rj.ght and the duty to dec lare yourselves 
Germans and National Social ists . You 
are the SERVANTS of the homeland. German· 
Na�i-i1m is a woTld philosophy. 61 
The events of March, 1938 , shocked the whole world .  Cn 
March 12 and 13 Rf.tler made his next decisive mo'1e and ir.vaded 
Austria , annexing i t  to the Reich. Belgium, the Netherlands , 
and Luxembourg all realized the ser1ou8ness of this event and 
60NYT , April 12 , 1937,  p .  1 .  
61 Dorothy Thompson , "Nazi Foreign Missions : German 
Propaganda in the U . S .  and the World" , V:t al Speeches of the 
Day, Ill (September 15 , 1937) , p .  7 1 3 . 
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the con•equenc•• it uould have on tuir futu-re . In a l.eich-
sta� 1peech a• far back •• May 21. 193� , Bitler had declared : 
Germany had nelther the 1ntention nor 
the will to iat.ervene in internal 
Austrian affair• or to aanex Augirt• 
and •o join Austria to h•r•elf. 
lt now ••emed that a.rman ••surane• over an1 matter wae worth• 
lees .  But it must be rem•mb•red that the ••.1 or1ty of th• Aue• 
triana welcomed the An•obl••• ·  
The Belgium M.ini1ter of POTeign Affairs , Paul-Jlttnri 
Spaak t reaffirmed his government ' • position before parliament . 
The poli.ay of independence is not perhaps 
the ideal policy, but it i• , 1 �ecome more 
convinced every day, Che beet poaa1ble 
policy .  • • Paced v-lth die debris of the 
Treaty of Locarno and the failure of the 
League of Natioee . what ahould we have 
done • • •  1lt: ia nec••••ry to keep in mlnd , 
above all preeonceived tbeoriea , the 
indi.sputable facta: our geographic poai­
tion , the rtlattvit1 of our foroea , the 
exi.1tence in our country of Fining• aad 
Walloon• ; it i• neceasary above all to 
kffp 1.n mind that decisive element : in 
weatem Europe , lelgbm ia an ez!ential 
factor of ltm'epean equilibrium. 
In Luxembourg, the prea1 carri•d 1uch veilent attacks agalnat 
rleniany' t! ac t i. on that on March 28 the lleicb issued a warnin.§ 
61 
Fraser, p .  103. 
63contrfbution a letude de la question ro�ale (truxellee : 
s .  A .  Edimco , 19465 , p.-68. citedinArango, Z.2 --4:. 
that further sttac�a would not b� t �l��a t�c . 64 The :Utch 
t'e11ction waa similar to th.at of Luxembourg and on May 5 the 
NSl>AP • •  official organ, the Voe lkiecher Beo�achter , report•d: 
We ••e the raoaMPnt approaching w,.,.n our 
patience will be exbaueted and �en we 
•hall have to look around for means of 
mald.ng the Dutch public realize that .a 
concinuation of this <leteatable activity 
serves nei ther it nor the Reich. !t will 
then be soar•ely poas1bl• to avoid tha t .  
in ncb a defen•• agaloat attack , economf.c 
relation• •hould play a role . 65 
On July 24 •od 25 the foreign ministers of th� (1s lo 
State• met at Copenhagen to explore problems of common inter•s t .  
They agreed to mab1tain contact with each otber to ao .. ope-rate 
i n  f!very e ffort at internat ional concilt.ation in a epir! t of 
1rnpArt ia t ly 1Qd independence with respect to the different groups 
of powers . They •l�o reaffirmed their J>O• ition •• regards the 
non-compul•orary character of ?Aague sanct ions . 
The •mall states bad two goala . First ,  they deaired 
to prevent th• return of the �yatea of balan�a of. power , �i i. ch 
�ould of neces a ity involve them in the political and mili tary 
entanglements of the Great Power• ; second , they wi.shed to re• 
strict as much •• poa8ible th•ir own obligations within the 
64 NYT , March 29, 1938 , p.  13 . 
65 
NYT , May 5 ,  1938 , p .  16 . 
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system of oollective aecurity. 
�lag tbe sUlllDer of 1938 events were develo,101 
toward• the c:.rman incorporation of Cl.lechos lovak ia. On • 
t•n•• day in late Sept .. ber the M•tberlanda cancelled all 
leaves and incr••••d her frontier suer•. lelgiwn alao in­
eweaeed her h'oop atTeogth and on September 27 S paall stated: 
The Great fowera have guaranteed Belgium ' •  
frontiers . and all recent inform.atioa in­
dicate• the•• engagement• will be kept. 
OUr territ�y will not be a battleground 
of Europe. 
Before the Le•su• As1em.bly, the Lus•bourg delegate declaredt 
The Govern .. a.t of Luxem.bour.g ha• never 
ceaaed to affirta that thAt geogra phical 
1ttuation of the country and the caaplete 
abaence of aean• of defea1e oblige th• 
Qo9enment to uintaln in th• League of 
Matioaa its traditional policy of neu­
trality impoaed upon the Orand•Duchy by 
the Treaty of Lg9•on ta the intere•t of 
European peace .. 
In accordance with thie policy Luxembourg refuaed to allow t·f'•r 
aaterlal to be tran•ported on her railro&de ,  th• government 
declared t:lult the G�and•Dueby would not sell war material to 
any country involved in • po•1tble conflic t ,.  .ven if it bactame 
necea1 ary to clo.e down her iron and 1tee l  mill• . 63 
66tftT, September 28 , 193! ; p .  17 . 
67texeeboura e !U, ae.-n lnvaeion . . . .  p .  29. 
68!!!., September 28, 1938 , p .  14 . 
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The Munich Conference on September 29 and 30 relt .eved 
the European ten1ion only temporarily. In November X ing 
Leopold o f  le 1�1.um made a visit to Holland , and on i t 1  �on-
c lusion Queen Wi lhelmina annQUnced her intention of • return 
vi.si t  tbe next year. During the Caecboalovak!an Ct'iate the 
two Lowland •t•t•• forgot old problns and visuali:ied the 
necessity of c loae collaborat ion 1n th.e poli tical and economic 
activity of ttw two nations . A eecret doc�nt ••nt to the 
General Staff of tba German Air Force on August 24 , 1938 , in-
di eated Germany ' s  intentions regarding the two Lowland 6 t a te s .  
lt read: 
!elgium and the Netherland• would , in 
�erman bands , ret>T•••nt •n extra-ordinary 
advantage i.n the Jrosecut ion of the air 
war against 3r�at Britain as well as 
s.gainat rrance . Therefore it :ts held 
to be e1 senti.al to obtain the opinion of 
the Army aa to th• cond i t ion• under which 
an occupation of thit area could be carried 
out and how lon1 i t  would take . and in the 
case i.t ''ould be necesaary to reaz•••• the 
commi tsnent agal.net Great !ritain. · 9 
In January of 1. 939 Bit ler began rai•ing the queation of 
coloni.es and demanded their redistrubution. not just tbe return 
of former f1.erman terri tori e a .  �rea t  Eritain, France , 8<.· lg111$, 
aad the Neth•rlanda were expected to contribute to a common 
69u.s • .  Office of u . s .  Chief of Counsel for ,ro1ecution 
of Axi s Criminality, Na�1 Con1piracy . . .  , Vol .  l ,  p .  762 . 
fund . ��llar:d was �re�9ured by the threat of a German econo-
�i.c bl1.>clcade.. fJnd1£:r this threat and the fear of growing German 
hosti lity, the value of the 1utcb guilde:t declined . However, 
the !}et"man �ropo!t al on coloaial red is tri.bu t ton was ignored by 
'..:ha.ncetlor M! tler , i.n his Reichstag speech on J anuary 
30, 1931, declare d :  
:;ennany is hat>?Y today in the possea:tion 
tJf ?•&eet'ul front iers in the WEt1 t ,  3outh, 
and Nartb. 
Our relations with the W•stern and Northern 
States ) Si:t t�e-rland , :Be lgium, i\l)lland , Uien­
mark , Norway, Sweden . •inland and the Baltic 
S t at•s , become all the 11\0re sat i s factory 
with the 1ncreaein3 tendency in these count• 
rie4 to turn away from eartain ar tic les of 
the Covenant of the L.eaf}Je o f  tiatioua which 
1nvo1 ved dang•r o f  war . � 
Th• Netherlands �as 4 t l l l  not reassu�ed by Uitler ' s s peech and 
withheld any official s �atement which would aggravate Germany 1 $  
a lreaJy seemingly ho1Jt11e .attitude . The !Juteh Foreign Hinister, 
Jan Patij n ,  on �ebruary 24 denied that at any time had his 
govet'runent given credence to rumors th1:1t ·3ermsny had p lans 
again�t the !iti<ther.lands . 71 
7�Adolf llitle.r . 3geech 1)alivered 
!!:!!, German Reicbstag on J4auarz 35, i939 
sohn R . J . , 1939). p .  61 . 
71NYT .  F�hruary 26,  1�3':1 ,  p .  1 2 .  
� Adolf H i tler �e for� 
(Berl i. n :  M Muller & 
on March 1 5 ,  193 9 ,  Hitler exhibited to all the world the "-'Orth 
of his word. On September 26 , 1938 , he had declared in a �peech 
at the �ports Pa lace in Berlin : 
I eetured Jt•r. t:tiamberl.� i n  and ! Tep.eat the 
••sured now, that when tbia prob l4"11 l 8  
solved there are n., further territor:tnl 
probleme for Germany in !uro�• · · ·  I further 
aaeured Mm that I sha l l  then be no l.on1•r 
i ntereated in the C �ech State . And I 
gwirant''- him tha t .  Me do not want �ny 
': �•c"g . . 
The Nethertands 0overnmer. t ilmn.edtately anr.nur:u�ed that 
i t  would B tren�then its boTdet: defencee but "'ou l.d s t i. 1  l avof.d 
any m i litary p .1\C t .  Pr l Nf'" � H n i a tf!'r Col i j n .  i n  !5 rad t o  liroatlcast 
on April 11 . � te �t'l.y Cl't.11tet! thnt the 1'utr.h r�tion • ... �4:-; not the 
result of recent events , but that the generAl ?uropean sit­
uation made 1 tr•ngthened border d•fenaes d•s i rable . 73 
Belgium took aiini.lar steps es she remembered what had 
happened to her in 1� 14 .  Hitler had uaed the �erman minority 
as a pretext for hie action in Ctechoslovak ia and telgium feared 
she would soon •uffer the ••me fate. On March 29 the Belgian 
government prote•ted to the Reich in regard• to a radiC't broadcast 
7 2  l'raser, p .  105. 
731.IYT. Aori l 12 . 1939 , ? ·  4 .  -
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fro:11 Col ogne «t'hich .fo ruuented • separatist 1a0vement in Eupeo 
and Ma1medy. '?be German Ambassador to Bfflgium, �!lcco Ka�l 
Alexander voa 1!.•te lO'A'•Scbwante, i.1:•iedi!!te lY. expreaaed hi1 
governUMtnt • s re•r•t and promlsed there t41c:>Uld b9 no recurTence 
of such activi. t.Y . 74 
l'>ue to the threatening E�ropean aitu�t ion , President 
Rooaeve lt ot t�le United States sent a t elegram to Ri.tler on 
Apri.1 lS ••k1ni the Chancellor if he w.ae willing to 31.ve aa11ur-
ance to eeveral independent nation• . Bitler reaponded by re• 
questing the coontries mentioned in tho telegl:am l.f the, felt 
threatened and if they had authort&ed aooaevelt to make the 
propoaa l .  Be lgium, the M� therlands , and LuxeMbourg were all 
included and all three ans�ered both question• in the n�gative . 
11\e German magazine Nns From Germany. a propaganda 
periodical publi ahed for circulation in fore ign coun.tri.es . in 
it3 June , 1939, isaue published .U.'1 article on the R.ei.cb ' •· r•-
lations with Hol land and BelgiU:dl. lt •aid , "The Ref.ch acknow• 
ledges without re1.erve the independence of both countries .  but 
\!1i sh�s i. t  to be r"1 pected �1 all o.ther natlon•-·likewiae . u7 5 
7:,. Mr'! , Harch 30 , 19 39 , � ·  S .  
15 11. R. Roffmann (ed . ) , "Germany ' s  Neighbourly relation• 
with Holland and Belgium'' , ?i� Pr<>! !!.!rnt.!nf, No. 10 (June , 1939) , 
p .  5 .  
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In May Hit ler had kgun laying plans for bis attack on 
Polaad and on the tweoty-aeeond be concluded the .. Pact of Steel0 
wi.th Muaeolini. Hia next atep v .. to begin negotiation• vttb tbe 
Scwiet Union fn a poaait>l• Ru1ao•Oentan pact. Thi e effort vu 
finally realised with the eiptag of • non-•aar•••ion pace: of 
ten J•ara duration on Au.gu•t 23. Meaawb1le, 'European attention 
waa focused on ev•nta in Warsaw and Berlin. <.=ermany demanded 
improv-nt of Pollah treatment of the German minority there 
and the retum of the city of Dan&ig to the bicb. 
By tbe Dliddle of Auguat Europe expected a German attack 
on Poland at al.moat any mc:aent. Belgium on .Auguat 21 called 
for a ... ting of the Oelo power• in lru.aaeh . In their o.,. 
Riq Leopold , in a radio broadeaat °" AugU9t 23 called "on 
the men who are reapon1ible f• the courae of event• to aub· 
mit their diapute1 and their c laim• to open negotiat1ona . u 76 
Belgium, the H•tberlanda , and Luxal>ouq were all noti.• 
tied by the German mnbu1..Sora i n  the reapective eountTiea that 
their border• would be napeoted in c .. • of var . In lelgium' •  
cue thi• 1••tun follow.d 1eJ.s1um ' •  aaauraooe on Augua t 25 that 
ah• would atay out of Cbe coaflict. 77 l.a.ulembourg followed 
76w1 111.am L. Shirer, Th• lliae and P""ll of the Third Re.icfa: 
A Hi a torz of •a&i Germany (Or;;owich, COftn . :  r8W'cett P'tlbl icat1ona � 
T9&25. p. '41 . 
. 
77
u.s . ,  De partment of State Publi cation, Document• on ....._ ___ _ 
OeftNln Poret1n Polic:y • • •  , Seri.•• D . , Vol .  VII , Ho. 279 (Waahington, 
D.C. : U . S .  Government Printing Office , 1956) , p. 290-29 1 .  
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suit on ,\uguat 2 5 . 7A T� the poss ibil ity of Luxetnbourg �us· 
pendin� iron sni �tee! proiuc tion . Germany res ponded by atating 
t:hat i t  •.t10Uld consider the action "d irected unilaterally sgain1t 
Cerman interests , anJ one difficult to reconc i le �1th Luxembourg 
neutrality . " 79 The Netherland• 1'&9 assured ty �.trman Amb••••dor 
to Kol land , J".Jl i.!Js von !(!-c�--I u:."kiarsroda .  80 
">utch .sr:t.1 !elgian mobili sat ion began on the 28th, follow-
ad tha t eveni .  n :s, by a joint ;;elgo-Dutch request to the ambassa· 
dors of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Poland to 
appear at the �tc:h :lepa-ctment of Fore ign A f fairs to receive 
an official communication .  A similar reques t  took place in 
Belgium. Each amba1sador "·•• informed that the King of Be lgium 
and the Queen of the ��ethet·lands were prepar•d to offer their 
good off i�es in order to bring the ,arties together . !lowe.ver . 
the of fer came to nothing. 
!n E�rlin on .\ugust 31, 193 9 .  Hitler iaaued .Ji rlictive 
No . 1 for the ct>nduc t of the t-'•r to the <:Jupreme Commander of 
the "rme..1 Pi:-1rces- . In the eecoud paragraph of poi.at n�?'aber three 
the directive � t �ted, ''The neutrality of Rolland , Belgiuai, 
Luxembourg and Sw:I ta er land to whi.ch we have given aseurances 
78 Ib1d . '  rto.  32 1 .  p . 32�·32 7 .  
791bid . , No . 1,0 2 .  p . �98 . 
80 !IL Aupat 27, 1939, p. 32 . 
must be acrt1n lmu1l� oh"erved . u81 "-iO- ..a � t b • ....... _ "" .. u�wn on ,.,ep em er 2. 
1U.tler sent his armored divt�tons :f.nt•o �oland . Th� days of 
'1unicb were gone and nn �eptembffr 3 ,  both rr4'ooe and Great 
'Sri ta in dee tared war on th� ,..�1."mtln Retch . P.t1ul 8ebmid t ,  Ri t ler ' 1 
interpTeter . de•crtbed Hitler ' •  reaction �pon the translation 
of the British note . 
8 1  
t'or a wbile ltitler eat i.n hi.s chair deep 
in thought, and •tared rather wontedly in• 
ta •pace • Then he broke hi� st lexi• T-1i th 
• • •  "What an we going to do now1 11 
Shirer, p. 782 .  
f!2D.,,,vid Thompson , Europe Si.nee Napoleon (N·«w York : 
Alfred A .  Knopf, 1962) . p .  715-716. 
CHAPTEa V 
THE END OF NEUTRALITY 
On September 1 .  1939, the t.uJtembourg ChaJ.t:ther vot�.e.d 
emergency powers to the grand•duoal government which c la i tned 
strict neutrality and forbade the tttxport of arms and muni t ioos 
1 on September 6 .  The Netherlands on September 4 declar•d : 
In connection with the s i tuation of war 
that now exi1 ts between some nation• • 
the Netherlands Qovernment waats to de­
clare tha� it will keep a strictly neutral 
attit:ude . 
In Be lgium a s imilar s tateG'Mtnt wae issued and the Lower house 
gave Xing Leopold dictatorial power to deal with the cri s is .  
In .giving aaauranoe to Belgium, the Netherlands a·nd 
Luxembourg , the German Government had rnade l.t clear that i t  
expected these states to conti.oue normal commerical activi ty 
with the Re1ch . 3  Luxembourg . which had iofe�ed a po1sihle 
1LuxembO!Jrg !!l!!. !.h!. C.rman Invasion . . .  • ? ·  32 � 
2Mrr, September 4 ,  1939 , p .  15.  
3 U . S  . •  Department of State Publication> Documents on 
German Pore ig� Policz • . •  • Series 0. , Vol .  '·'111 1  No. 17, p .  l6· 17 .  
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s toppage of its iron and steel works ln the case of a gen•r�l 
European war, infoTmed the R�ich on September 7 that suob an 
action did not imply a fai lure on Lux•mbourg t s  part to main• 
tain neutrality even though the Reich had state� it would . 4  
However the Luxembourg Govenunent indicated that for the time 
being, iron and steel product iOft would continue . 
In a •pe•ch from the throae openin1 parliamen�, Queen 
Wilhelmina of the N•therlands stated on September 19:  
I appear befcn:'e you. in gloomy clrcum• taoeea 
• • •  al though the country has beeo able to 
prea•rv• ite peace.. I feel deep eompaa• ion 
for tho1te nations auffering war. Our friendly 
relations continue with all pwers , especi.ally 
the Os lo group e . ,  The 0110 group ' s  col l•bo�a­
tion was expresaed in Ki.ng Leopold ' •  appeal 
"for peaee'' and in our common of fer of good 
offices . Although we were di. 1appolnted, 
hope still remains . 
The economic life of the Netherlands bas 
been hi. t ,  �ainly on aceoont of the mertne 
warfare , but our finances are unsha�en • . .  
Trade wi ll continue ae normally •• poeaible . 
11\e nation ' •  unt.ty and morale are ex•mt>lary. 5 
Throughout the two deeadea between the world wars , th• 
Netherland• had alwaya nfuaed to aocept any guarantee of her 
independence and territorial integri ty . Belgium, on tbe other 
hand , had formed a military alliance w-ith France in 1920 , had 
ilbid . ,  No . 20 , p. 19·20 . 
5NYT, September 20 , 1939, p .  1 2 .  
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been a aignatory to the Loca�no Treaties , and when ahe was 
relea11Jed from the Locarno agreement• , she had accepted gu.ar.s.n-
tees from Great !ritai n ,  France . and �er��oy. Therefore . from 
a pure ly theoritical point of view, Be lgium • s  sta tus was not 
as firmly founded aa that of the Netherlands . I..uxembou�g ' s  
neutrality waa somewhere in between . "Our neutrality 11 
guarantee d by the numerous tr•atie1 to which Germany , Fr.anc� . 
and Great Britain are parties . . . .. 6 
Hitler e poke of Germany ' • rel�tions wi th Holland 
and Belgium in the Reiohatag on October 6 ,  1939 . 
The new Reich has endeavored to continue 
the tradit ional friendship � 1 th Hollan� : 
it did not take over any differences be­
t14eeo the two Statet ,  nor did it creat• 
new onee • • •  tmmediately after I had taken 
ov�r the Government , I tried to estitb: i•h 
fri•ndly relation• with !.elgi.um. I re• 
(lm.1nced a.,y revision •• i..1ell :tlf =-ny· da n l.re 
for revi1ion. The Reich has put forward 
no c1auo whi.eh mi�ht in any way hav• betlo. 
regarded •• a threat to lelgium . 7  
Tb• following day an order from the Commander•in•Chi•f 
of the Army, General Walther Von Brauchitsch, to various Army 
Groups contained the passage : 
5 NYT .  September 2 7 ,  1939, p .  8 .  -
7Adol_. Bitler, S f>eech • . •  On October i• 1939 (Derli.n:  N 
Muller & Sohn K . t. , 1939) ,  p. 19. 
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Army Group B has to make all preparations 
according to special ordara , feyc immediate 
invasion of .Juteh and B�lgiAn territor8 , 1.f the political si tuation so demands . 
Two days later Hitler peraottsl ly directed: 
?reparations should be made for offeo•ive 
act�on on thE northern flank o! the �esten� 
Front crossing the area of Luxembourg , Bel­
gium and Holland . This attack mus t be 
CQt"r 1. ed out as soon and as forcefully as 
poasible • . •  The ubjecc 11 to acquire aa 
ireat an area of Hol land , B��gJ.um and 
Northern France as poaaible . 
In a aecret letter from �rroan General Keitel concerning Fall 
Gelb (code naat• for op•ration1 io tbe Low e:ountr:i.ea) , he wrote , 
"The more Dutch territory we occupy th• more eff•c t i ve c11n the 
defen•• of the Ruhr area be made . 0 10 A?parently R i. t ler intended 
to invade the Lowland state• in early Novemb�r of 1939, but for 
aome unknown rea1on , perhaps adverse w•ather , ha postponed the 
attack . 11 
lo hope• of avert ing a further excensioo of the �;ar, 
King Leopold of Belgium and 0\leen Wi.lhelmina of the N<! therumds 
again offered their eood ofticea to the belligerent 1tates . 12 
The quick defeat of Poland and the mas•ing of ('�rman troops 
8u . s . , Office of u.s .  Chl.ef C()unael for Pro1ecueion of 
Axix Criminality. tiaz i  Conapira.cy . . •  , Vol. ! ,  p .  766 . 
91bid. 
10 Ihid . • p .  6 34 .  
1 1vandenboach. p .  284 . 
12!![.. November 8 ,  1939 , p.  4 .  S•• Appen�ix IX* 
lt7 
-'llong the fruot.iers ot �elgitim and nol land m'hle S t  esa•rt t i !l l  
for the Be lgians and Dutch to combine their e ffort1 . �i t lct 
c laimed the troops were r••ervea and the area was sui table 
!or b i l leting. The German move may only have been a feint to 
aee how the Ne therland& and !e lgium would reac t .  
·rne t:.elgian•Dutcb off�r of t.heir gooci offi.ces came to 
nothing . In Germany, 'Ribbentrop informed Franz vou Papt'l1.., 
that th• offer would not even be an•wered . Papen refered it 
to Goering vho atated that Hitler and Aibbentrop bad �de up 
their minds to have it out with Britain. lJ 
The Netherland s '  c ity of Venloo becartie the scene of 
an important incident in German-Dutch relati on• on Ncvmrber 
9 1  1939. HE>mbera of the (;erman V.atapo croesttd �h• border and 
ld.dnapped two 1..ritish agents , and in tbe ensuing gun batt le . 
an officer of the Netherlands r•neral Staff was k i lled . The 
Duteb Government i�diately requeated Germany to exp lain the 
•ction, but the Reich Governm..lnt denied any knowledge of the 
affair. However , towarda the end of �ovemb6r , ;�nuany d�manded 
th£C the N�therlanda explain the presence of a Outch General 
�t:aff officer "rith the !Titieh agente . T.hft bic:h also charged 
13 
" -� 
Franz von Papen , Franz � fapec; M��"<>irs , tran� . 
n-ri an Con.nell ('Ne9ol York : Dutton & Company ,  Inc . ,  1953) ) p . .'d � 5 -
1 1 8  
t�at t.hc n�ucr£1 &tBtea were bein;; unC'ennined l-y the' UetH: ern 
p\n.Jerr1 . '!'hu• l:.:i tler "'•• already laying the frameworl<. of h i �  
future rtlesona for attacking the Lowlftnd stttte s .  
:\long tbi11 sasr.e theme , Germany clai•d tbet the Nether-
land1 W&ti bein& foiced to sub�it �o Eritain ' 8 bloc�ade against 
Germany. On November ll , th� :iut.ch dec lared ! 
� �If' do not wish to become an extension 
of 'Ur!.tieh measur\tl! against "'term.any, 
uor do ti'e wiah the oppoa 1 te • . •  It 1 !I 
becauae we are neutral f�t we must 
adopt such an attitude . � 
�� lgi� �a• the o�ject of an attack by the Voel�1scher 
harboro were �-e i11g used to tran11fer goods f·rorn r.e�J trL:l countriea 
1 t, to Britain. · - l'he G6'�n pre•• further tri«...: to fl:'iibten the 
1.owland a tatei; into le4v1ng the Lt!ague ,.,f Nations by ·iecl•ring 
that neutrals Attending Leaau• meet ings were �ilty of unneutret 
aote aiace th1t- League h.sd become an •tt-.nglo-French organ . n16 
1ii tlcr' a i.ntent1on to attack Rolland 4nd �el�iuri• �s" 
c le�Tly lnid d?Wn on Nov�er 23. 
My decia ion ls uneh4ngAble . t �hall a ttaek 
Franoe and England at the mo•t favorable and 
earlieat ttc>ment. Breach of the neutrality 
of Pf.llgiuir. and Holland i !f  of no importaoceo 
1 :�!!!!t November 11 , 1939 . t;» .  � .  
p:, 
--- .!fil• November 17 , 1939 • p .  t .  
16vaadenboech . p .  286·?.8 7 .  
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�ot �n� �i l l  quest ion that when we have 
1;;.i:..»t: .. � .  e sha 1 1  not jufft { f y· the breach 
of neutra l i ty as ldiotlcally as in 1914 . 17 
The neutr�ls h&� a trong tusp1c1onR of tbi � i n tention, and 
a!t a result tb•r• •was a marked change in their attitude ril!! · 
gardi ng the i r  pos i t i on . I n  !elgium on December li th� Fore ign 
Affairs Committee of the ChambeT of �putie• approved n r&port 
9tati.n.g. that ucondit 1 ons that led us to ado1't neutra l i ty ca...x i.d 
be modi f!ed0 if the Netherl•nda ��ere attack�d. ie. fhree �ays 
lat•r Foreign Mini 1 ter Spaak reaffirmed ?-elgtusr. • s  neutral i t_y 
but added, 0Be l3ium would never be iadi fferm t 1hou11 t i1* 
1.ndependence of the N�therlaud1 be threatened .  ul <.l 
In the N•tberl.4nds , the Dutch pres• 'W&• &110 •zh� bitir.� 
a change of att itude by the end of � cember. Wo lon �er did 
they constantly refer to principles of international la� nnj 
moral ex.pressione . Instead , there waa grim determination t· o 
face �h11tever the future might hold. Tlutre "'1as also 1>. fl>rOr:'>'>�el 
a t  this time to neutral i �• Luxembourg as an t n tern � t 1 or.�l hos p i •  
t11 l �one . 1n thi.s way , the Grand-OUchy hoped to !urthfir securE: 
their i ndependence . 
In the early part of Janu)lry.. 1940 � the �r�!.s• !!. i::;a�fl!t te 
17sh1rer, p .  8 70 .  
18m,, D.cember 13 , 1939, p . 5 .. 
l9MTT -· Decembe-r 20 . 1939 � p .  3 .  
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carried an article recounting bow the Belgian defeoae line• 
could aviftly be occupied by French troop• •hould Germany in­
vade Belai�n. The Ayfiff, organ of Germany ' •  Propaganda 
Miaiatry reacted quickly with a warning. 
Deepit• the periloue pcNaition of their 
country there are always Belgian journalist• 
who do DOt bow how to quit playtna with 
flre • • •  Such propaganda i• an infraction 
ot nntrali.ty. for it ai• to prepare opin• 
ion for French and Engliah invaaion of 
Bel1iua. 
Why doe• the Belgium Governmeat make ao 
little uae of it.a full power• to remain 
silent befcn-e tbie provocation aetivity? 20 
Meamirbile, Dutch-Belgo relation• were improving more 
every day. In a diae�sian l>etveea S paak ad the C.rman Amba••­
ador to Belgium on January 11,  Spaak reaffirmed hia country' • 
attitude ahould Holland be attacked by either 1ide of the 
ensuing conflic t . 21 In the Retharlanda Foreign Minister Van 
kleffena declared on January 2S that .. economic relations between 
the N•tberlanda and Be lgium. •hould be made aa narrow as poaaibl• o" 22 
Httler ordered the attack on Belgium and Bolland to be-
gin on January 17, but oa tbe tenth. a Ceman military plane was 
forced down over Belgian territory. In a note later released 
2011L J•llU.UY 1 .  1940 , ,_ 1 .  
21u. s . ,  Department of State Publication, .Documents on 
German roreian Policz • • • •  Seri•• o . •  Vol .  VIII . No .  '22, p�96'46 . 
22vrr, January 26, 1940 , p. 5 .  
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by tbe Belgian Govern.eat ,  it wu dieo lffed that the plane wae 
carrying OeftMln plans for the attack in the Yeat. Thua the 
operacioft acheduled for the eaventeenth waa called off. ln a 
top aecret diapatob froa lU.bbenttop to the Gefttuan !mb•••Y in 
Belgium, the Gel'IDall Ambaaeador ••• ordered to claim no knowledge 
of the inc 1.dent aQd r.11\d the Be lain Government of a Belgian 
troop butld·up alona the Cermaa-lel.gian frontter. 23 Again 
Oeftt&Dy was trying to .. tabllab a pntut for the future r'.erman 
inva1ion of Belgiuna. 
The war -J:rade Ap .... nt signed by heaoe , Great Britain, 
and Belgiua in •ebruary eatellebed thac .. lgi\11'1 •• to re­
frain &oa re•aportillg •llDaterial th.an abe did before the 
vu .  24 Thia waa a move bJ tbe Allied Power• to eurtail Germany' •  
uae of B•laita to evade tbe :Allied blockade and added to the 
<Jenae liet of grievane• .. at.ut the LowlAlnd atate . In mid­
A&*l.1, Germany began cinula•:t.n1 tnaora about a poaaible inva­
aion of Rolland aad Belgium by the Allied Fore.. . Then came 
the Gee.an invaaion of Mol:w•J· 
The fate of Roway ••• an iodlcatf.on to both Belgium and 
23u.s . , Depart=ent of State Publication, Document! on 
Qenaan Pon!a! folioz, • •  , Seri• D. , Vol .  VIII,  Ho. 585, p • ...,.23. 
24 
lrtr. l•bruary 15, 1940 , p . 4 .  
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th• Netherlan;i$ that they '1�r• next . During a parliamentary 
debate on April 16 and 17 , roreiJPl Mini•t•r Spaak of Belgium 
declaredi 
Probably like th• rest of you, during the 
pa1t month• I have often thought about our 
foreian policy aanounc•d five year8 ago . 
Just the other evening I reread th• variou• 
diplomatic acts wbf.ch concern ua and the 
dec larations which accompanied them. And 
I arrived once more at the cOt"aforting COtJ• 
vic tton that our foreign policy hae been 
perfectly loyal and clear, perfectly hon•st . 
Ooubtle•• • few countries have ao w�ll de• 
fined their objeetive1 , limited their aom­
mitment1 to those whi.ch they vtre sure of 
bein1 able to aupport , and enlightened 
their nei ghbors regarding their intentions . 
Witb �• there 11 neither abrupt cbana• nor 
surprise; whatever happen• , no one uill be 
2 5  able t o  ••Y tbat he waa deceived by l&lgium. 
Porelcn Miniater M .  Beck of Luxembourg . concerned about hi• 
country ' • fate , prote•t•d against th• military preparation• 
and conetruot icme on Germany' •  western frontier . To the G�rman 
�ieiater in Luxembourg he remarked: 
I ebould feel •• •ch easier if you could 
tell me that you are personally convinced 
that JO\lr Government h•• no intention of6 violat ing the neutrality of my eouatry. 2  
Rowev•r, the German mini ster evaded the que1 tioo and made no 
25
contributioe !. letude de la gueatloo roJale (Bruxelles : s . A ldi1DC0, 1946), p. 112. clt';d !n .Arango . p .  �4. 
26 Luxembourg � !!!!. Germ.Ml Invasion . . ..  , p .  33 . 
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answer. 
On May 9 ,  Luxembourg receiv•d word of an impendiag 
German attack. In the Netherlands Van � teffens received a 
call from the OUtch Intelligence Se:rv1.ce wh1.cb had int•r�epted 
a ae1aa1e fi-om !•rlin . I t  read, uTo•morr� at dawn � bold 
tight . 027 At dawn on the next day. May 10 . 194 0 ,  the •xpected 
came ae one and a quarter mi l lion lerman troop• (6 1 division•) 
poured into 8.f!lgf.um, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands .  
11lf-' �erman Government charged that the press in the 
Lowland state• had been hostile and defenee measures ta.ken by 
them showed a c lear departure from neutrality: they h•d forti-
fied their eastern frontiers and left the wes tern and southern 
ones open. For these reasons •nd for the purpo•• of protecting 
the Lowland gtatea from an impendtq All ied Jnva11ion , �ennany 
occupied tb'9 three neutra l state s .  CJupport. for th• G�rinan 
claim of sn Allied invasion was preeented in the form of a 
White J.ook which eontained several eye•wi tness reports cc tn� 
pre1ence of Allied aoldiera in the recently occupied 1tate1 . � 8 
The end came quickly •• tbe Bene lux nation• were ove¥ 
27 John \,� .  Whee ler•lennett, The Nem1is of Potter: The 
German Army in Politics,  1918-1945 'l'2ftd ed. ; Loftdon : MaeMillan & 
Company , Ltd7';' 1964) ,  p .  496. 
23 
German Foreign Office ,  Al lied Intrigue !!. !!!.!. J:.2.! 
Countriea: Further Docn.mente Concerning the Aagll•Prencb Po 1 icy 
of Extendin! the War (Rew York t German Library o Information . 
194�). p .  i -1!:" ---
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whelmed by the nutr�rically and technically supertor German 
forces . The flutch arn1y eapi.tulated on iv-� .t.y 15 , followed by 
the surren.der of the J!.e lgi.an ermy on the night of May 27 . The 
German victory not only dentroyed the independence nnd territor• 
1.al integrity o! the three f>enelwt states , it alao des ti:oyed 
neutrality a• a feasible international principle . 
I �- -�-.;: 
·--:. 
Lint's· uF !"C1rti "i'cntions 
Frumu�llritisll 
C<'rmdn 
� J.fuin Ct"rman uttodt.i 
Fig. 4 The German Invasion , May 1940 ------
CBAFl'D VI 
COllCWIIOI 
In any historical pr•1entation, objectivity oa the 
part of the author ia an ••••ntial factor . However, if it i1  
the author' s  i ntention to develop a particular the1 i 1 ,  objecti• 
vity may suffer in the procesa. It 11 therefore neceasary to 
point out that thia work involve• an interpretation of the 
facts leading to a certain bypotheei1 . Raai Germany collapsed 
only a little over twenty year• ago, and it i• for thia reaaon 
that any evaluation of the Third Reich rauet be handled 1n a 
delicate manner. Much as been pub111hed on this period of 
German bi1tory, but personal exper1encea and prejudice• have 
often blurred the .. objective" endeavors of the authora . It baa 
been •Y ala to search out the ••ailabl• facta and to puraue •• 
nearly •• poaeible a methodology of objectivitJ. 
In 1919 ao att-,t ... Mele to create a new and better 
international •1•tem for the purpoae of eliminatina foreeful 
or violent aolutiona to international disputes . Thia attempt 
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was expreseed in the form of the Covenant of the League of 
Ration• , and its basi• was the Treaty of Versailles-·• poor 
foundation for any organiaation dedieated to world peace and 
the equality of atates . As history has shown, the new sys tem 
va1 finally destroyed by the very seed1 from which it aprang 
and re111lted in another world war . Many faetor• were involved 
in the gradual break dowa of tbls ayatem, but the moat potent 
cause wae nationali81D. 
Nationaliam still rules aupr ... . . .  It 
seem• today at the climax of its histori• 
cal development . It haa penetrated all 
countriea and all continent• . It has 
aroused ever•growing numbers of formerly 
non-nattonalistie or non-active ma•ses 
into active nationaliam. It ..... to 
have es tablished its dominion over all 
land1 and over all aea1 . Wit:h the popu­
lation of fascist countrie1 ,  Italy and 
Qermany, oationalia• baa become •lmo•t 
a frenzy and a fury • • •  Humanity seems 
loat and abandoned without hope ty a 
world gone mad with nationalism. 
Hitler played natlonaliam to it• extreme . Naz i. Germany 
became an entity above all other criteria, and the individual 
waa subordinated to its existence. Thie included not only 
those living within the boundaries of the Reich, but also 
Germans residing in foreign countriea . Th• basic difference 
la.an• 'Kohn. "The Twilight of Nationalism?" 
Scholar , VI (SUDIR8r ,  193 7) , p .  266. 
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between the two group• waa that tho•• living outside O.rmany 
bee ... an ia�tant tool of Bitl•r ' •  foreign policy. But. thl• 
vaa to be expected eoo1idering Qewmaay ' •  veak military poai· 
tion in the early thirti•• and th• hench syst• of alliances 
which encircled Geraaay. In order to regain her 1tatu• •• a 
great power, GeTSaany had to re•eatablisb her military macbiae 
and break the French alllaaee •1•tea. 
Due to the depre11ion and the 1ntemal problems that 
existed within th• other luropeaa. ataiea at this time* Hitler 
vaa able to repudiate the Vereaill•• verdict and to beain the 
rebulldina of hi• artl'led fore•• · In the area of diplomacy h• 
••plotted tile non•aaareaa icm pact. Thi• ••• a pact between 
tvo neisbbntag atatea not to make war on doh other for a 
oertaln peTiod. I t  OOl\tained no obligation• to act •• allies 
•1•ill•t other natione . 'I1aus tbe •••1• could elaia it v•• a 
,aot deaigned for peace 1fbe.•e•• moec other treatiea w•r• all!· 
aace1 for purpoaee of war. The aen•aaareaaion pact 1erved aa 
a ••nse of aecnarity fer the other eon�ractin1 pai:ty while it 
.... Bi.tlel" th• time he nffcled to e•plete hi• doeeet1o pro• 
p... More important . it enabled bi.a to t.nak up tlw Preoell 
•Y•tem of alliance• . A• a counter-part to hi• policy of con• 
olu.ding paota involving only two nation• , be vaa to l•t•r lean 
towarcla the vro-ecutioa of var• involving only two oation1 . 
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In the ca1e1 of BelgiWI , Luxembourg , and th• 9ether­
land1 Hitler offered them non-aggr•e•ion pacts but wae turned 
down by each. Luxembourg aad the Nethe�lands botb refused on 
the ground• of their neutrality. Belgium alway• relied on 
her military agreement with France and when thte waa die1olved 
in 1936, the lelgiaa Govenuaent turned to a polciy of "iode· 
1Mndenceu whieh c lo1ely reeembled neutrality . Therefore •h• 
waa never in a position to accept a paet from Hi tler . 
World War I had w.ekened faith in the idea of buffer 
e tat••· and in the priaciple of guaranteed neutrality••Belgium 
and Lux81ftbourg were glaring exalpl•• of tte fat.lure . llt!utrality 
failed not •• a reeult of an internal veakn••• but beoauae of 
external forcea. In a period of riatng nattooaltem. neutrality 
vaa not a fea1ibl• policy to puraue . In the late 1930 ' •  
lelaium, Luxembourg, and tta. Netherland• con1tantly profe1aed 
their neutrality but to no avail . As long •• i t  wae in the 
i.nten1ta of a nationallati.e •tat• like Ma•i Germany• neutrality 
would be violated whenever fe .. ible . Germany regarded • sudden 
and decisive blow in the We•t ea1ent iul for a quick end of the 
war and a German victory. France bad to be eliminated immedi­
ately aod the only way was to smaab at the French frontier through 
the Lowland etatee . A• a pretext for it• action. tb• Reich 
Government claimed i t  was protecting the neutral 1tate1 from a 
13() 
forthcoming Allied invas ion . Ban� J .  �orgeothau 11-rote in 
19.39: 
The fate of neutrality of srna!.l !tates 
• • •  ultimately will aot be decided by 
them, but by the Great Powers ; �nd thi• 
decitioo will be made . not according to 
legal formulae and ideoloaical priacipl.ea , 
but according t:o t:he real yr preaumed 
interest• of tho•• Power1 . 
!n � world where "power politic8" is the rul•, neu-
trality can serve •• a fe .. ible foreign policy only so long 
aa it ia ic the intareats of otber · ,owera to rea ,ect i t .  In 
the beginning Naa1 G�rmany re•pected the neutrality o f  the 
ama.11 European •tat•• • not from any moral conaiderattone , but 
due to her impotent atatue after World War I .  They alao pro-
vi ded a convenient 1biald behind which Gel:'many could prepare 
for her future actiou . Ooce Germany bad reaumed the atatus 
as a "might0 ttate under Nazi Nl• , •b• too could play Hpower 
?Olitics . "  And, •• fate would have it , Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherland• wen caught in the mi.ddle . 
2 
Morgentbau. The Alaerican Political Sc ience lleview, 
XXXlll, Ro. l.  p.  486-:--
APPIRDIX I 
The Belgiac argument for revi•ton of the Tr�aty of 
1839 wa1 clarified by Miniater Ort • 
• . •  fir•t ,  that the violation of tbtt Treaty 
by Germany and Austria w.. the ori.gin of the 
war between BelgimD atad th••• countrie1 , 
and that in order to •nd the war and ult• 
peace it te indiapenaable to revert to 
treaties, the violation of wbicb cauaed 
the war. 
Second, the l•laian delegate• have •hovn 
that all the ap-eeme.nt1 of 1839 form one 
treaty, which are lnaeparable. 
"l'bird , th• delegate• have ahown th• dangers 
of incenveniel\Oee vhtcb the treaty created 
for Belgium, whieb the experience of the 
war haa proved •ufficiently. 
Pourth, th• delegate• propoaed that Holland, 
altboush nautral ,  should be invited to ••nd 
rapresentativ•• to thi• conference.* 
"'NYT, March 15, 1919, p. 1 .  
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APPENDIX 11 
An out line of Belgium ' • position on the Franco• 
!fflgo occupation of thti! R.uhr in 1923 was preaent•d by Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Af fair• M .  Jaa par . 
1 think Ge1'1114DJ cannot avoid • • •  making 
a propos ition eoon • • •  The aoooe'f 1he 
i.D&kes it the better · it will be for her. 
Germany ie completely cut off from the 
auhr and can no loa.ger receive coal , 
coke or aioeral products . whee••• 
through our oraaniaatioa of transport 
we aend 10,000 tOGI of coal and coke 
daily lnto Fraace aod l�lgiwa, with 
which tbe bl.eat furuacea of both 
couritriea are kept going a• in pTe-
war day1. Froa this the aolutioa 11 
evident • . • •  1 have not the s lightest doubt 
• • •  that Germany 1• capable of paying as 
much now •·• last January . Th••• facts 
an not forgotten: first , that Genaany , 
cut off from the Ruhr, had enough coal 
and coke in reaerve to continue wo�k aa 
in the preceding few months ; secondly, 
that she waa able to throw quantities 
of foTeign bill• into the ma.rlcet ao aa 
temporarily to arrea t  the fall of the 
mark ; third . all German y ' •  iaduetrial 
apparatu.--coal minea , factorie• , rail­
road• • •hi pping and her nev fleet•• ara 
intact • • •  EV4tr e tnce the armla tia• Belgium 
baa adopted a moderate attitude and hae 
ende•vored to avoid rigorous metbod1 . 
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,Mor� th.an once i.e lgi.um b�a succited�d 
in unitina her frienda , England and 
Ft:a:oi:e, in ord•l:' to arrive at sn am:i• 
cable aolution . c;e,rmeny baa , however, 
oppoaed all our attempt• at moderation, 
vitb obstinate bad faith, refu•iog to 
deliver th• coal and wood oecess�ry for 
the rebuilding of factori•• and th• re­
�onstruetion of the devaatated region• , 
and by refualng to pay the swna abe 
agreed to pay . She or.gaoiced the fall 
of the mark by printing pa�r money, 
and becau•• she refused to tax the 
population 1be ha• been unable to bal• 
ance her budget • • .  
BelgiUlll ta not 1 triving for any political 
obj ect in the Kuhr , and i t  would be ridieuloua 
to attribute traperialisttc id••• to our country. 
She merely wi1hea to force the C.rman indua· 
tria 1 power• , which are very rt.ch and who•• 
faetoriee are all •till intact , to pay or 
guarantee the reparations for Germany • • •  
We can no longer accept 1imple promi•I!• or 
eignaturet from -Germany • • • •  * 
*N'YTt April 28 . 192l, p .  3 .  
APPENDIX III 
1'be following is part of King Albert • •  letter to 
2rime Minister M .  Renkin. 
Each atate • • •  aet1.1ig :tne;1e�ndently, has 
used all the ••n• at its cl'lsposal to 
prevent it• own national economy from. 
being affected by the cr1ais. By the 
constant increase of cus tw,as duti.es , 
$Urtaxes and quotaa , by the control 
.<J.f t rade and exchange ,, efforts. seem 
to have be4n made everywhere to re-
. . !ucc? haports . The result has bel.fil'! 
.tn lnevitable rflduction of expor�s .  
The consequenccrn of thts restricted 
?Oltcy have bee·n disa1teroua � it. bad 
le·:t, tc> use the expression of the 
League of Nations ' Financ ial Coomi­
s s ion, to a gradual "1tifllng ()f 
international trade . 0  
For three ye.ara the value of i1.lter­
national trade hae been reduced by 
half ,  and thi• reduction la only 
partially due to the fall in prices . 
The �ontraction of foreign iaat-kete 
haa not been cempenaated· by a eor­
reepoad lng ezpan.1ion of the nati.oaal 
mara•t ;  the latter ' s capacity of 
consumption diminish•• • teadi ly. 
During the same period of three yeara , 
the nuaber of unemployed ha• doubled . 
It ha• tma been definitely prov•d that 
no' country ta able . by 1.teelt. to 
alter in i ts favor the course of ecoao­
mic evolution . A concerted ac t.ion of 
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t-hn <Jtatf!:4 t�, ��d.:t f t-i 'tft.,"n.a t i c'r>� l -,,,li • 
darity can alone eure the grave evila 
fJ:r>rr. which t:M �.,orld 1.t suffer.i. ng .  
It 1• tlme that thia solidari ty should 
a�11�rt i tself otherwise than by •pieeches . 
I t  seema to me that Belgium should not 
h�s i tate to take the tn it� Ptiv� �-htc� 
ci rcumstances require ,  and to secure to 
tbis end the help of the States which, 
l ike our country, felt keenly the nee••· 
e1ty of a cban�• in economic policy , 
I know, my dear Prime Mintat!er, th.at you 
and all the member" of my novemment· 
ahan my amd.ett ea.  I n ly on you and 
your colleague• to take the measures 
r9<1Uired by an increasingly alarmin� 
aitu•tioo . *  
APPDDIX IV 
The National Socialist Retl\frlanda Worker ' • Partx 
v.. directed by Major voa �ruyt and it• prograa contained 
the following peinte. 
1 .  We demand , eepecially 1a tb• cultural 
and economic fields , that on the baaia of 
the right of self·d•t•rmination all Nether­
landers be inc luded in • Greater Betherlanda . 
2 .  We demand that our nation, culturally. 
politically and economically, ebould aaaume 
a Garmaoie attitude of mind and aentiment : 
that thereby we 1bould be broupt e loae to 
our brother nationa••Wl•ioga , Boera , Germana ,  
German Swiae aod Scaadinaviaa•••ao that to• 
aether, •• tbe bearen of a renevad ve1ta-n 
culture , ve may in a mighty union re1 1 a t i n  
influence of other national 1roup1 . 
3 .  Only be can be a oitiaen who i.a a member 
of the nation. All tho•• a�e member• of 
the nation who are bound together by race, 
culture and biatorioal deatiay. No Jew 
can be a member of the nation ! 
4 .  H• who 1• not a citiaen, can oaly llv• 
in the Netherland• ea a gueat under guest 
law.• 
'*World COllldttee for the V1 ctuma of German Paacism. 
'11\e Brown Mevork • • .  , p .  140-141. - --- ---
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APPENDIX V 
In • mete0randUt11 from L@opold von Roesch, the a.rman 
Ambas1ador to Great Britain. to Anthony Eden . the Bri ti sh 
Secretary of State for Poreign Affa:l.r• , th• G-fllrmAn di.plomat 
clarif1.ed the German po�d t!on on the Franco-Sovie� µact 
(memorandum: dat•<l March 7 ,  1936) . 
l .  I t  ia an un.-Jiaputed fact that the 
Franeo-Soviet Pact ia exc lu1 i.a ly dir­
ected a�a1nat Germany. 
i .  lt 11 an undisputed fact that i n  
the Pact France undertakea , in the event 
ot a conflict betwMn Germany aad the 
Soviet; Union, oblisat iona Mlich go far 
beyond her dutJ •• laid down l.n the 
Cov•nant of the League of Nation• , and 
which compel her to take aili tary ac:tioa 
agaiaat Cer.any even when •h• c•nnot 
appeal ei th•r to a recomm.ndat ton or to 
an ac tual deci•ioa of the Counci l  of the 
League . 
3 .  I t  i s  an undi•puted fact that f'ranc• . 
in such a c••• , c taima tor bar••lf th• 
right to decide oe her own judgement vbo 
i• the aggre1aor. 
4 .  I t  1• thereby eatabli•h•d tbat Prance 
ha• undertaken towude the Soviet Unioa 
obligation• �htch practically amount to 
undertaking ic a given case to act •• i f  
neltber the Covenant of the Leagu• of 
137 
138 
Nations . no� the llhloe Pact , which 
refer1 to the Covenant , were vali d . •  
*Gantenbein, p .  651-652 . 
APPENDIX VI 
!n a speech before parli ament on Y:srch 11 , 1936 . 
Premier Van �eeland stated hi• government ' s position on 
Gttrmany' s  mareb into the Rhine land . 
Violation of the Locarno Treaty and 
reoccupation of the Rhineland were • 
sever• bl°"7 to pacifist people1 • . •  and 
Belgium i 1  the country threatened mo9t 
. .  The extatence of a demilitarized zone 
on our German frontier constituted pro-
tection behind wht.cb we felt l••• exposed . 
If i t  is true today that no country 1.n the 
'\Jorld i.s able to •••ure its mm security 
a lone , 1 t is even surer tmen app 1 ied fo a 
small nat i on , for which respect for int•r.· 
nat ional law asaumes capital importance . 
The t./.)carao Treaty has be@n repeatedly aaid 
to be the foundation and the essential part 
of Belgium' s internat i onal status . Germany ' s  
act ion in tearing it up Mtrikes !el�iu.n: more 
gravely and aeverly than any other country . 
Yet Belgium baa adhered firmly to her part i n  
this pact .  The German memorandum takes as a 
pre-text the pretnded violation in th.� Franco­
�oviet pac t ,  but !elgium bad no part and no 
connect i on with the Franco·S�viet negotiation . 
For ua i t  ha• co consequences , for we are neither 
directly nor indirectly concerned. 
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�c can say without fear of contra­
dict ion that we have kept the 
Locarno Treaty not only in letter, 
but in spiri t .  We have been ab•o­
lutely loyal and c lear . • • .  • 
*MYT, Ma.rel\ 12 , 1936, p .  13. 
APPENDIX Vll 
The foll01ring ia tbe joint declaration by �lgium, 
Denmark , Jinland, Morway, g,,,..eden, the N�therlands , Spain and 
Switzerland on July l ,  1936 , which in effect wae a cancellation 
of their obligation• under Article XVI of the Covenant of th• 
League of Nations . 
The aggravated international aituation 
and in case• in vbich in r�cent year• 
under violation of the Covenant of the 
League of "ationa resort vaa taken to 
violeace • • •  bave given rise to grave 
doubt• in our aind1 whether the pr•· 
tai••• under which we had talen upon 
our1elvea tbe obligations contained in 
the Covenant •till continue to exiat 
to a aattafaotory extent . In our opinion 
it cannot be admitted that certain article• 
of the Covenant of the L••JUe • • •  remaln a 
dead letter 1'herea1 other article• ar• ap• 
plied • • •  Although we call attention to the 
priaciplea of interpretation ado�ted i n  
1921 with regard to the ••Plication of 
Artiele 16 of the Covenant ,  we declare 
that •• loug •• the Covenant in it• entirety 
i• applied only in an incomplete and incon• 
aiataftt aanner, we an obliged to take this 
faet into account in applying th••• articles .* 
*Societe dee Nations, Journal off. , � · Stleci a l � No. 15� , 
p .  17, 18 · Neue Zurcher Zeitung, .July �193�ited in Mor�enthau � 
The AaMtrican Political Science &evi.rw, XXXIII . No. 3 ,  p. 473 . - ---- _..__ _ ---- - -
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APPENDIX VIJ.l 
After England and France released Belgium frCT'!l the 
Locarno Pac t ,  Germany gsve the Benelux state s c lear and un• 
conditional �arantee on October 13 , 193 7 .  
S ince th� conclusion o f  a treaty t o  re-
place the treaty of Locarno may a t i l l  
take s ome  t ime , and being desiroua of 
stren�thening the peaceful ••piration11J 
of the two countrie8 , the German Govern-
ment re�ardl! it at approt>riate to def1.ne 
now 1 ts own att·ltude towards Belgtum . To 
this end, i t  ma�es the follar�in� dec lara­
tion: Fir� t , the German �ov�rnment has 
taken not of t�e vie�• which the Be l g i um 
r..overment has thou�ht fit to expr@s s . 
That is to Ray , ( �) of the policy of 
independence whf.ch i t  intends to exerci s e  
:l.n full sovereignity ; (b) of its deterinina• 
tion to de fend th• fron tiers of Be lgium 
wi.th a l l  it11 force1 against any ag�ress ions 
or invasion and to prev�nt Belgian ter�itory 
from being used for �urposea of aggres sion 
againat another state as passage or as a base 
of operation by land , by sea , or !. n  the air, 
and to organize the defenses of Belgium in 
an efficient: manner to this purpose . T"o :  
the �erman tJovernment eon1ider1 that the 
inviolability and i.ntegrity of Belg 1.um are 
common interests of the We8tern Powers . It 
1 4 3  
.::onfirma its determi.nation t h a t  in no 
c i rcums tances will it impair this inv1o­
labil1 ty and i nt•grity and that lt wi ll 
at all times respect Belgian territory 
exc•pt, of course, f n  the event of 
Belgium ' •  takinz !'ftrt :i n  a mili tary 
act ion directed again•t Germany in an 
armed conflict in which Germany 1• in­
wlve d .  The t;er:r.un '1overnment, l i ke 
the Briti•h and French Govermnent• ,  is 
prepared to tu1s1.st Bc· l.gtum should she b� 
1ubj ected to an attack or invasion . •  
*U . S . , Office of U. � .  Chief Coun•el for Prosecution 
of Axi• Criminality, N•zi Con•piracy . . . • Vol .  I . p .  761-762. 
APPENDIX IX 
The followtng i.s the offer of gooJ offices by K i ng 
Leo{Jold of B<ilghnn and Cueen �'1i.lhelmina of the Netherlands in 
November of 1939. 
At this hour of anx:tety for the vhol.a world , 
before the war b1'eau out on the Weee.m 
Front in all it• violence . we ha.a the con­
viction that it is our duty once again to 
r•i•• our voice. 
Sometime ago the belliger•nt partiea have 
decl4red they vould not be unwilling to 
exMlne a reaaonble and vell foun4ed baaia 
for equita�le peace . 
I t  seems to u• that in the pre1ent circurn­
atancea lt 1• difft.eult for them to come into 
contact in order to atate their standpoint• 
with graater preo1e1.on and bring th• nearer 
oae another . 
As tM aove-reigaa of two neutral States having 
good relations with alt their neighbors we are 
ready to offer tbeat our good offices . l f  thl• 
waft agreeable to them we are diaposed to facili · 
tate by every meana at our dispo•al that they 
IRipt cu• to suggest to u and in the •pirit of 
f*iendly underatanding to a.certain the elements 
of an agreement to be arrived at . 
Thi1 , it ••ema to ua , 1• the task we have to 
fulfill for tbe good of our people• and ia the 
ioter•at1 of the whole world . 
We hope our offer will b• accepted and that thus 
the fira t  step will be taken toward aa eatablf.sh­
.. nt of a durable peace . *  
*!!I, November 8 ,  1 � 3 9 .  p. t .. .  
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